

Among the objects which the subject surveys we have not yet mentioned the surveyor itself. That must certainly be mentioned. For it undoubtedly is surveyed as for instance in these reflexions of ours. A difficulty at once occurs. For at the outset we made a modal division, classifying as ^{the} objects whatever is present to our awareness or thought and as the subject something other to which the object is present and which stands over against the object. It was characterised primarily as a not-object to which all objects ~~are~~ are necessarily related. Yet now we must think of it as a possible object. Where ^{the} everything that exists is a possible object we have already discussed; there is no doubt that everything which we can specify is, there is ~~therefore~~ ^{thus} no doubt that the subject is. And not only is the subject in general a possible and actual object, but also particular subjects. Are you thinking about Anita? This is not an obscure or abstruse question; nor is it a general one; it is about a particular subject, you here and now. Or, 'how much have I thought about her during the last hour?' My ability to answer this, which I may well possess, implies a knowledge about myself qua subject, which forms one term in the question. All subjects, ~~then~~, may become objects; and when they do so they ~~can~~ ^{can} stand as such in a necessary relation to other subjects. For instance my thought of Anita (subject 1) ~~may~~ stands related to my thought 'have I thought of her' (subject 2). Subject 2 is the subject of subject 1. qua object. Or the subject in general may stand as object over against a particular subject (subject n). So far there is no difficulty. But it might here be objected that at least one ^{kind of} subject can never be surveyed, viz. that subject, which comes into being when we carry the process of thinking of a thought of a thought of a thought of etc. as far as we choose. So stated the objection would not be sound. For we can and do survey this subject in thinking

of it as the subject which comes into being etc. In so doing this subject at the end of the infinite regress, we have thought the only thing it can be thought of in general. But a further and more objection can be made.

Of Anita? I did not merely examine the general character of thinking of Anita, I did not merely have a conception, but must also have had some direct intuition of a particular, viz the thought of Anita. Otherwise I could not have answered my question. That particular subject, the I then and there, was thus capable not only of being apprehended in some general manner, but being directly intuited.

We have already argued that if of 2 objects, one, A, is capable of being conceived only, and the other B of being conceived and intuited, they cannot be identical. And if a person fails to intuit B, he cannot have a proper knowledge of it. Now if all subjects as such are so constituted that they can only be known by intuition and therefore only thro' it completely known, it follows that the subject at the end of the regress can never be completely known (unless by god or some other person, a case, which I shall consider in a minute). But to say that the subject can never be completely known is to say that some part of it is absolutely unknowable. But if it is at all false to say that anything is in principle absolutely unknowable it follows that our account of the knowledge of the subject involving as it does an infinite regress is false, as I we are now shall now try to show on other grounds.

We should add that in the foregoing account there has been no allusion to time. It is not the question of whether a subject can note an indefinitely large number of things at once, e.g. Anita, the thought of her, the thought of the thought of her etc. nor again the question of whether, if not, it can do so. It is their nature that they are already fast. Of this more anon. But however we answer these two questions, the infinite regress and the difficulty, if

which ~~in~~ it involves will arise.

Let us consider what we know about the subject. Our knowledge may be divided into two as follows. First we have knowledge ~~about~~ particular subjects, or better of particular subjective states, and secondly of the general nature of the subject, of what being a subject is. Take the former. You ask me, 'have you decided whether your maid is honest?' Hereupon I might begin to revolve in my mind the evidence I have, but this would not be relevant to your question. You don't say 'is the maid honest?'; but 'have you come to any conclusion' and thus a further examination of all the facts I know about the maid does not help me to answer. Does your question does not concern my maid but my own former mental condition. What was it? Did I come to a conclusion? If I know whether I came to a conclusion I know something more than the whole sum of facts which I reviewed in order to reach it. I know something about the state of my own mind. Now how do I know? When did I acquire that knowledge? Suppose I decided, 'guilty.' I may review the facts again and assuming my own wisdom, say 'of course I must have decided guilty.' Yes. I decided guilty. But did I decide at all? Did I think the thing out before? An examination of the proposition 'she is guilty' won't yield an answer to your question. I must therefore if I can answer it at all have some direct acquaintance with my particular mental phases; ~~and so indeed I do.~~ ~~that~~ they must become the objects of my survey or awareness. Need they? Or, in other words, are all my mental phases also objects of my awareness? According to the ^{argument of the} last paragraph certain ~~of~~ phases cannot be. But we have already indicated that that argument ~~is not~~ will not prove to be altogether sound. ~~But~~ let us however suggest some other questions that are involved in this question, need they? You ask me 'why didn't you

ask Lamond to your wedding' and I answer 'I forgot.' In fact I didn't forget but thought 'I don't want to see him at my wedding and be reminded of those debts of gratitude which I owe him from of old and bear so ill.' But in answering you I don't remember that I thought that; I have clean forgotten that mental phase which prevented my asking him, and that too tho' in answering, you know I think 'yes, and I am glad I didn't ^{ask} ~~ask~~ him' for the above reason. This is an instance of common forgetfulness. But is it possible that tho' before the wedding my mind passed thro' this phase of mean thinking, I never knew it, that this particular mental phase was never the object of my thought? I thought this thing of Lamond, but never thought 'I have thought this thing of Lamond'. In that case ~~there~~ we should not have an instance of forgetfulness; we do not forget what we have never known; it would be an instance merely of a failure to observe one mental phase. Can such a failure occur? But let us ~~bring~~ ~~eliminate~~ ~~the~~ ~~element~~ of memory. You say now 'won't you ask Lamond to your wedding?' I think ^{Lamond's presence would fit me with the bloom} ~~about all what I want to have~~ ~~at my wedding~~, and answer 'yes, I want to, but can't find his address at the moment', without intending to deceive. My conduct is explained by the fact that I have actually failed to notice by my thought that Lamond would be an unwelcome guest. This is not incompatible with remembering both thoughts later, ~~any~~ ~~for~~ unless we are to state dogmatically that it is impossible to have a direct intuition of an object across a space of time. For such a statement there would seem to be no reason. Later in the day on reflecting I may think 'By Jove, I was thinking those things about Lamond at the very moment that I told ~~him~~ my friend that I wanted to ask him. How odd! I notice now for the first time that I have had such thoughts of Lamond. This much at least we can say now. If we are to hold that all subjective phases must also be objects of survey, they must be simultaneous objects at the same time as they are subjects. If they are not objects at the same time, then within even must they be? A minute, an hour, 24 hours, a lifetime? But such is

~~There is no case at all that involves willful blindness.~~

As regards the limitation ~~made above concerning~~
~~and for some other period, not much can be said now. It~~
~~does not cover willful blindness had a direct intention~~
of this state of a subject not guilty, but know only