Involuntary Unemployment and the Business Cycle

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Abstract

We propose a monetary model in which the unemployed satisfy the official US definition of unemployment: they are people without jobs who are (i) currently making concrete efforts to find work and (ii) willing and able to work. In addition, our model has the property that people searching for jobs are better off if they find a job than if they do not (i.e., unemployment is ‘involuntary’). We integrate our model of involuntary unemployment into the simple New Keynesian framework with no capital and use the resulting model to discuss the concept of the ‘non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment’. We then integrate the model into a medium sized DSGE model with capital and show that the resulting model does as well as existing models at accounting for the response of standard macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks and two technology shocks. In addition, the model does well at accounting for the response of the labor force and unemployment rate to the three shocks.

Keywords: DSGE, unemployment, business cycles, monetary policy, Bayesian estimation.

JEL codes: E2, E3, E5, J2, J6

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1. Introduction

The unemployment rate is a key variable of interest to policy makers. A shortcoming of standard monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models is that they are silent about this important variable. Work has begun recently on the task of introducing unemployment into DSGE models. However, the approaches taken to date assume the existence of perfect consumption insurance against labor market outcomes, so that consumption is the same for employed and non-employed households. With this kind of insurance, a household is delighted to be unemployed because it is an opportunity to enjoy leisure without a drop in consumption.\footnote{The drop in utility reflects that models typically assume preferences that are additively separable in consumption and labor or that have the King, Plosser, Rebelo (1988) form. Examples include Blanchard and Gali (2009), Christiano, Iltu, Motto and Rostagno (2008), Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2009,2009a), Christoffel, Costain, de Walque, Kuester, Linzert, Millard, and Pierrard (2009), Christoffel, and Kuester (2008), Christoffel, Kuester and Linzert (2009), den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000), Gali (2009), Gali, Smets and Wouters (2010), Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2009), Groshenny (2009), Krause, Lopez-Salido and Lubik (2008), Lechthaler, Merkl and Snower (2009), Sala, Soderstrom and Trigari (2008), Sveen and Weinke (2008, 2009), Thomas (2008), Trigari (2009) and Walsh (2005).} In contrast, the theory of unemployment developed here has the implication that the unemployed are worse off than the employed. Our approach follows the work of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and others, in which finding a job requires exerting a privately observed effort.\footnote{An early paper that considers unobserved effort is Shavell and Weiss (1979). Our approach is also closely related to the efficiency wage literature, as in Alexopoulos (2004).} In this type of environment, the higher utility enjoyed by employed households is necessary for people to have the incentive to search for and keep jobs.\footnote{Lack of perfect insurance in practice probably reflects other factors too, such as adverse selection. Alternatively, Kocherlakota (1996) explores lack of commitment as a rationale for incomplete insurance. Lack of perfect insurance is not necessary for the unemployed to be worse off than the employed (see Rogerson and Wright, 1988).}

We define unemployment the way it is defined by the agencies that collect the data. To be officially ‘unemployed’ a person must assert that she (i) has recently taken concrete steps to secure employment and (ii) is currently available for work.\footnote{See the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm#unemployed, for an extended discussion of the definition of unemployment, including the survey questions used to determine a household’s employment status.}\footnote{There is a substantial sociological literature that associates unemployment with an increased likelihood of suicide and domestic violence.} To capture (i) we assume that people who wish to be employed must undertake a costly effort. Our model has the implication that a person who asserts (i) and (ii) enjoys more utility if she finds a job than if she does not, i.e., unemployment is ‘involuntary’. Empirical evidence appears to be consistent with the notion that unemployment is in practice more of a burden than a blessing.\footnote{There is a substantial sociological literature that associates unemployment with an increased likelihood of suicide and domestic violence.} For example, Chetty and Looney (2006) and Gruber (1997) find that US households suffer roughly a 10 percent drop in consumption when they lose their job. Also, there is a substantial literature which purports to find evidence that insurance against labor market outcomes
is imperfect. An early example is Cochrane (1991). These observations motivate our third defining characteristic of unemployment: (iii) a person looking for work is worse off if they fail to find a job than if they find one.\textsuperscript{6}

To highlight the mechanisms in our model, we introduce it into the simplest possible DSGE framework, the model presented by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) (CGG). The CGG model has frictions in the setting of prices, but it has no capital accumulation and no wage-setting frictions. In our model, households gather into families for the purpose of partially ensuring themselves against bad labor market outcomes. Each household experiences a privately observed shock that determines its aversion to work. Households that experience a sufficiently high aversion to work stay out of the labor force. The other households join the labor force and are employed with a probability that is an increasing function of a privately observed effort. The only thing about a household that is observed is whether or not it is employed. Although consumption insurance is desirable in our environment, perfect insurance is not feasible because everyone would claim high work aversion and stay out of the labor force. We view the family as a stand-in for the various market and non-market arrangements that actual households have for dealing with idiosyncratic labor market outcomes. Accordingly, households are assumed to have no access to loan markets, while families have access to complete markets.

In principle, in an environment like ours the wage would be set through a bargaining mechanism. Instead, for simplicity we suppose the wage rate is determined competitively so that firms and families take the wage rate as given.\textsuperscript{7} Firms face no search frictions and hire workers up to the point where marginal costs and benefits are equated. Although individual households face uncertainty as to who will work and who will not, families are sufficiently large that there is no uncertainty at the family level. Once the family sets incentives by allocating more consumption to employed households than to non-employed households, it knows exactly how many households will find work. The family takes the wage rate as given and adjusts employment incentives until the marginal cost (in terms of foregone leisure and consumption insurance)

\textsuperscript{6}Although all the monetary DSGE models that we know of fail (iii), they do not fail (ii). In these models there are workers who are not employed and who would say ‘yes’ in response to the question, ‘are you currently available for work?’. Although such people in effect declare their willingness to take an action that reduces utility, they would in fact do so. This is because they are members of a large family insurance pool. They obey the family’s instruction that they value a job according to the value assigned by the family, not themselves. In these models everything about the individual household is observable to the family, and it is implicitly assumed that the family has the technology necessary to enforce verifiable behavior. In our environment - and we suspect this is true in practice - the presence of private information makes it impossible to enforce a labor market allocation that does not completely reflect the preferences of the individual household. (For further discussion, see Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin, 2009, 2009a).

\textsuperscript{7}One interpretation of our environment is that job markets occur on Lucas-Phelps-Prescott type ‘islands’. Effort is required to reach those islands, but a person who finds the island finds a perfectly competitive labor market. For recent work that uses a metaphor of this type, see Veracierto (2007).
reduced consumption insurance) of additional market work equals the marginal benefit. The firm and family first order necessary conditions of optimization are sufficient to determine the equilibrium wage rate.

Our environment has a simple representative agent formulation, in which the representative agent has an indirect utility function that is a function only of market consumption and labor. As a result, our model is observationally equivalent to the CGG model when only the data addressed by CGG are considered. In particular, our model implies the three equilibrium conditions of the New Keynesian model: an IS curve, a Phillips curve and a monetary policy rule. The conditions can be written in the usual way, in terms of the ‘output gap’. The output gap is the difference between actual output and output in the ‘efficient equilibrium’: the equilibrium in which there are no price setting frictions and distortions from monopoly power are extinguished. In our model there is a simple relation between the output gap and the ‘unemployment gap’: the difference between actual and efficient unemployment.\(^8\) The presence of this gap in our model allows us to discuss the microeconomic foundations of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). The NAIRU plays a prominent role in public discussions about the inflation outlook, as well as in discussions of monetary and labor market policies. In practice, these discussions leave the formal economic foundations of the NAIRU unspecified. This paper, in effect takes a step towards integrating the NAIRU into the formal quantitative apparatus of monetary DSGE models.\(^9\)

Next, we introduce our model of unemployment into a medium-sized monetary DSGE model that has been fit to actual data. In particular, we work with a version of the model proposed in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) (CEE). In this model there is monopoly power in the setting of wages, there are wage setting frictions, capital accumulation and other features.\(^10\) We estimate and evaluate our model using the Bayesian version of the impulse response matching procedure proposed in Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2009a) (CTW). The impulse response methodology has proved useful in the basic model formulation stage of model construction, and this is why we use it here. The three shocks we consider are the ones considered in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2004) (ACEL). In particular, we consider VAR-based estimates of the impulse responses of macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock, a neutral technology shock and an investment-specific technology shock. Our model can match the impulse responses of standard variables as well as the standard model. However, our model also does a good job matching the responses of the labor force and unemployment to the three shocks.

The next two sections lay out our model in the context of the CGG and CEE models,

\(^8\)This relationship is a formalization of the widely discussed ‘Okun’s law’.
\(^9\)For another approach, see Gali (2010).
\(^10\)The model of wage setting in the standard DSGE model is the one proposed in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
respectively. After that, we estimate the parameters of medium-sized model and report our results. The paper ends with concluding remarks. In those remarks we draw attention to some microeconomic implications of our model. We describe evidence that provides tentative support for the model.

2. An Unemployment-based Phillips Curve

To highlight the mechanisms in our model of unemployment, we embed it into the framework with price setting frictions, flexible wages and no capital analyzed in CGG. The agents in our model are heterogeneous, some households are in the labor force and some are out. Moreover, of those who are in the labor force, some are employed and some are unemployed. Despite this heterogeneity, the model has a representative agent representation. As a result, the linearized equilibrium conditions of the model can be written in the same form as those in CGG. Indeed, relative to a standard macroeconomic data set that includes consumption, employment, inflation and the interest rate, but not unemployment and the labor force, our model and CGG are observationally equivalent.\(^{11}\)

In our environment, the output gap is proportional to what we call the unemployment gap, the difference between the actual and efficient rates of unemployment. As a result, the Phillips curve can also be expressed in terms of the unemployment gap. We discuss the implications of the theory developed here for the NAIRU and for the problem of forecasting inflation.

2.1. Families, Households and the Labor Market

The economy is populated by a large number of identical families. The representative family’s optimization problem is:

\[
\max_{\{C_t, h_t, B_{t+1}\}} E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(C_t, h_t), \quad \beta \in (0, 1),
\]

subject to

\[
P_t C_t + B_{t+1} \leq B_t R_{t-1} + W_t h_t + \text{Transfers and profits}_t.
\]

\(^{11}\)We found that there is a certain sense in which the welfare implications of the CGG model and our model are also equivalent. In the technical appendix to this paper we display examples in which data are generated from our model of involuntary unemployment and provided to an econometrician who estimates the CGG model using a data set that does not include unemployment and the labor force. Consistent with the observational equivalence result, the econometrician’s misspecified model fits the data as well as the true model (i.e., our involuntary unemployment model). To our surprise, when the econometrician computes the welfare cost of business cycles, he finds that they coincide, to 11 digits after the decimal, with the true cost of business cycles. Thus, our model suggests that studies such as Lucas (1987), which abstract from imperfections in labor market insurance, do not underestimate the welfare cost of business cycles. This finding is consistent with similar findings reported by Imrohoroğlu (1989) and Atkeson and Phelan (1994).
Here, $C_t$, $h_t$ denote family consumption and market work, respectively. In addition, $B_{t+1}$ denotes the quantity of a nominal bond purchased by the family in period $t$. Also, $R_t$ denotes the one-period gross nominal rate of interest on a bond purchased in period $t$. Finally, $W_t$ denotes the competitively determined nominal wage rate. The family takes $W_t$ as given and makes arrangements to set $h_t$ so that the relevant marginal conditions are satisfied.

The representative family is composed of a large number of ex ante identical households. The households band together into families for the purpose of insuring themselves as best they can against idiosyncratic labor market outcomes. Individual households have no access to credit or insurance markets other than through their arrangements with the family. In part, we view the family construct as a stand-in for the market and non-market arrangements that actual households use to insure against idiosyncratic labor market experiences. In part, we are following Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), in using the family construct as a technical device to prevent the appearance of difficult-to-model wealth dispersion among households. We emphasize that, although there is no dispersion in household wealth in our model, there is dispersion in consumption.

The family utility function, $u(\cdot, \cdot)$ in (2.1), is the utility attained by the solution to an efficient risk sharing problem subject to incentive constraints, for given values of $C_t$ and $h_t$. Our simplifying assumptions guarantee that $u(\cdot, \cdot)$ has a simple analytic representation. An important simplifying assumption is that consumption allocations across households within the family are contingent only upon a household’s current employment status, and not on its employment history.\(^\text{12}\)

The representative family is composed of a unit measure of households. We follow Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988) in supposing that household employment is indivisible. A household can either supply one unit of labor, or none at all.\(^\text{13}\) This assumption is consistent with the fact that most variation in total hours worked over the business cycle reflects variations in numbers of people employed, rather than in hours per person.

At the start of the period, each household in the family draws a privately observed idiosyncratic shock, $l$, from a uniform distribution with support, $[0, 1]$.\(^\text{14}\) The random variable, $l$, determines the household’s utility cost of working:

$$F + \varsigma_l (1 + \sigma_L) l^{\sigma_L}.$$  \(^\text{(2.3)}\)

The parameters, $\varsigma_l, \sigma_L \geq 0$ and $F$ are common to all households. The object $\varsigma_l$ is potentially

\(^{12}\)The analysis of Atkeson and Lucas (1995) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) suggests that ex ante utility would be greater if consumption allocations could be made contingent on a household’s reports of its past labor market outcomes.

\(^{13}\)The indivisible labor assumption has attracted substantial attention recently. See, for example, Mulligan (2001), and Krussell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and Sahin (2008, 2009).

\(^{14}\)A recent paper which emphasizes a richer pattern of idiosyncracies at the individual firm and household level is Brown, Merkl and Snower (2009).
stochastic. It is one shock, among several, that is included in the analysis in order to
document what happens when the NAIRU is stochastic. After drawing \( \lambda \), a household decides
whether or not to participate in the labor market. A household that chooses to participate
must choose a privately observed job search effort, \( e \).\(^{15} \) The larger is \( e \), the greater is the
household’s chance of finding a job.

Consider a household which has drawn an idiosyncratic work aversion shock, \( l \), and
chooses to participate in the labor market. This household has utility given by:\(^{16} \)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ex post utility of household that joins labor force and finds a job} &= p(e_t) \left[ \log(c_t^{nw}) - \zeta_t (1 + \sigma_L) l^{\sigma_L} - \frac{1}{2} e^2 \right] \\
\text{ex post utility of household that joins labor force and fails to find a job} &= (1 - p(e_t)) \left[ \log(c_t^{nw}) - \frac{1}{2} e^2 \right].
\end{align*}
\]

Here, \( c_t^{nw} \) and \( c_t^{nw} \) denote the consumption of employed and non-employed households, respectively. An individual household’s consumption can only be dependent on its employment status and labor type because these are the only household characteristics that are publicly observed. In (2.4), \( p(e_t) \) denotes the probability that a household which participates in the labor market and exerts effort, \( e_t \), finds a job. This probability is the following linear function of \( e_t \geq 0 \):

\[
p(e_t) = \eta + ae_t, \quad \eta, a \geq 0.
\]

The only admissible model parameterizations are those that imply \( 0 \leq p(e_t) \leq 1 \) in equilib-
rium.\(^{17} \) The object \( e^2 / 2 \) is the utility cost associated with effort. In (2.4) we have structured
the utility cost of employment so that \( \sigma_L \) affects its variance in the cross section and not its
mean.\(^{18} \)

A household which participates in the labor force and has idiosyncratic work aversion,
\( l \), selects search effort \( e_{t,t} \geq 0 \) to maximize (2.4). This leads to the following necessary and

\(^{15} \)In principle, we would still have a model of ‘involuntary unemployment’ if we just made effort unobserv-
abla le a n da l l o w e dt h eh o u s e h o l da v e r s i o nt ow o r k , \( l \), be observable. The manuscript focuses on the symmetric
case where both \( e \) and \( l \) are not observed, and it would be interesting to explore the other case.

\(^{16} \)The utility function of the household is assumed to be additively separable, as is the case in most of
the DSGE literature. In the technical appendix, we show how to implement the analysis when the utility
function is non-separable.

\(^{17} \)The specification of \( p(e) \) in (2.5) allows for probabilities greater than unity. We could alternatively
specify the probability function to be \( \min \{ \eta + ae_t, 1 \} \). This would complicate some of the notation and
the corner would have to be ignored anyway given the solution strategy that we pursue.

\(^{18} \)To see this, note:

\[
\begin{align*}
\int_0^1 (1 + \sigma_L) l^{\sigma_L} \, dl &= 1, \\
\int_0^1 [(1 + \sigma_L) l^{\sigma_L} - 1]^2 \, dl &= \frac{\sigma_L^2}{1 + 2\sigma_L}.
\end{align*}
\]
sufficient condition:

\[ e_{l,t} = \max \left\{ a \left( \log \left[ \frac{c_{l}}{c_{l}^{nw}} \right] - F - \zeta_{t} (1 + \sigma_{L}) l^{\sigma_{L}} \right), 0 \right\} . \]

The corresponding probability of finding a job is:

\[ p(e_{l,t}) = \eta + a^2 \max \left\{ \log \left[ \frac{c_{l}}{c_{l}^{nw}} \right] - F - \zeta_{t} (1 + \sigma_{L}) l^{\sigma_{L}}, 0 \right\} . \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.6)

Collect the terms in \( p(e_{l,t}) \) in (2.4) and then substitute out for \( p(e_{l,t}) \) using \( p(e_{l,t}) \) in (2.6).

We then find that the utility of a household that draws work aversion index, \( l \), and chooses to participate in the labor force is:

\[
\left[ \eta + a^2 \max \left\{ \log \left[ \frac{c_{l}}{c_{l}^{nw}} \right] - F - \zeta_{t} (1 + \sigma_{L}) l^{\sigma_{L}}, 0 \right\} \right] \times \left[ \log \left( \frac{c_{l}}{c_{l}^{nw}} \right) - F - \zeta_{t} (1 + \sigma_{L}) l^{\sigma_{L}} \right] + \log (c_{l}^{nw})
- \frac{1}{2} \left[ a \left( \log \left[ \frac{c_{l}}{c_{l}^{nw}} \right] - F - \zeta_{t} (1 + \sigma_{L}) l^{\sigma_{L}} \right), 0 \right]\right]^{2}.
\]  \hspace{1cm} (2.7)

The utility of households which do not participate in the labor force is simply:

\[ \log (c_{l}^{nw}). \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.8)

Let \( m_{t} \) denote the value of \( l \) for which a household is just indifferent between participating and not participating in the labor force (i.e., (2.7) is equal to (2.8)):

\[ \log \left[ \frac{c_{l}}{c_{l}^{nw}} \right] = F + \zeta_{t} (1 + \sigma_{L}) m_{t}^{\sigma_{L}}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.9)

For households with \( 1 \geq l \geq m_{t} \), (2.7) is smaller than (2.8). They choose to be out of the labor force. For households with \( 0 \leq l < m_{t} \) (2.7) is greater than (2.8), and they strictly prefer to be in the labor force. By setting \( c_{l}^{w} \) and \( c_{r}^{nw} \) according to (2.9) the family incentivizes the \( m_{t} \) households with the least work aversion to participate in the labor force. Imposing (2.9) on (2.7), we find that the ex ante utility of households which draw \( l \leq m_{t} \) is:

\[ \eta \zeta_{t} (1 + \sigma_{L}) (m_{t}^{\sigma_{L}} - l^{\sigma_{L}}) + \frac{1}{2} a^2 \zeta_{t}^2 (1 + \sigma_{L})^2 (m_{t}^{\sigma_{L}} - l^{\sigma_{L}})^2 + \log (c_{l}^{nw}) . \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.10)

If households with work aversion index \( l \in [0, m_{t}] \) participate in the labor force, then the number of employed households, \( h_{t} \), is:

\[ h_{t} = \int_{0}^{m_{t}} p(e_{l,t}) \, dl, \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.11)
or, after making use of (2.6) and (2.9) and rearranging,

\[ h_t = m_t \eta + a^2 \zeta_t \sigma_L m_t^{\sigma_L + 1}. \] (2.12)

Note that the right side is equal to zero for \( m_t = 0 \). In addition, the right side of (2.12) is unbounded above and monotonically increasing in \( m_t \). As a result, for any value of \( h_t \geq 0 \) there exists a unique value of \( m_t \geq 0 \) that satisfies (2.12), which we express as follows:

\[ m_t = f (h_t, \zeta_t), \] (2.13)

where \( f \) is monotonically increasing in \( h_t \).

Let \( \bar{p}_t \) denote the largest value of \( p (e_{l,t}) \). Evidently, \( \bar{p}_t \) is the probability associated with the household having the least aversion to work, \( l = 0 \). Setting \( l = 0 \) in (2.6) and imposing (2.9):

\[ \bar{p}_t = \eta + \zeta_t a^2 (1 + \sigma_L) m_t^{\sigma_L}. \] (2.14)

We require

\[ \bar{p}_t \leq 1, \] (2.15)

for all \( t \). We assume that model parameters have been chosen to guarantee this condition holds.

From (2.11) and the fact that \( p (e_{l,t}) \) is strictly decreasing in \( l \), we see that

\[ h_t < m_t \bar{p}_t. \]

It then follows from (2.15) that \( h_t < m_t \), so that the unemployment rate, \( u_t \),

\[ u_t = \frac{m_t - h_t}{m_t}, \] (2.16)

is strictly positive. We gain insight into the determinants of the unemployment rate in the model, by substituting out \( h_t \) in (2.16) using (2.12):

\[ u_t = 1 - \eta - a^2 \zeta_t \sigma_L m_t^{\sigma_L}. \] (2.17)

According to (2.17), a rise in the labor force is associated with a proportionately greater rise in employment, so that the unemployment rate falls. This greater rise in employment reflects that an increase in the labor force requires raising employment incentives, and this simultaneously generates an increase in search intensity. From (2.11) we see that \( h_t \) is linear in \( m_t \) if search intensity is held constant, but that \( h_t/m_t \) increases with \( m_t \) if search intensity increases with \( m_t \). That search intensity indeed does increase in \( m_t \) can be seen by substituting (2.9) into (2.6). It is important to note that the theory developed here does not imply that the empirical scatter plot of the unemployment rate against the labor force lies
rigidly on a negatively sloped line. Equation (2.17) shows that disturbances in $\zeta_t$ (or in the parameters of the search technology, (2.5)) would make the scatter of $u_t$ versus $m_t$ resemble a shotgun blast rather than a line. A similar observation can be made about the relationship between $h_t$ and $m_t$ in the context of (2.12).

Consider a household with aversion to work, $l$, which participates in the labor force. For such a household the ex post utility of finding work minus the ex post utility of not finding work is:

$$\Delta (l) = \log \left[ \frac{c_t^w}{c_t^{nw}} \right] - F - \zeta_t (1 + \sigma_L) l^{\sigma_L}.$$  

Condition (2.9) guarantees that, with one exception, $\Delta (l) > 0$. That is, among households that participate in the labor force, those that find work are strictly better off than those that do not. The exceptional case is the marginal household with $m = l$, which sets search effort to zero and finds a job with probability $\eta$. The ex post utility enjoyed by the marginal household is the same, whether its job search is successful or not.

In addition to the incentive constraint, the allocation of consumption across employed and non-employed households must also satisfy the following resource constraint:

$$h_t c_t^w + (1 - h_t) c_t^{nw} = C_t.$$  

(2.18)

Here, $C_t$ is the aggregate consumption of the family and $h_t$ is the fraction of households that is employed. Solving (2.18) and (2.9), for $c_t^{nw}$:

$$c_t^{nw} = \frac{C_t}{h_t \left( e^{F + \zeta_t (1 + \sigma_L) m_t^{\sigma_L} L^{\sigma_L}} - 1 \right) + 1}.$$  

(2.19)

Integrating the utility, (2.10), of the $m_t$ households in the labor force and the utility, (2.8), of the $1 - m_t$ households not in the labor force, we obtain:

$$\int_0^{m_t} \left[ \eta \zeta_t (1 + \sigma_L) (m_t^{\sigma_L} - l^{\sigma_L}) + \frac{1}{2} \sigma_t^2 \left( 1 + \sigma_L \right)^2 (m_t^{\sigma_L} - l^{\sigma_L})^2 \right] dl + \log (c_t^{nw}).$$  

(2.20)

Evaluating the integral, and making use of (2.13) and (2.19), we obtain

$$u (C_t, h_t) = \log (C_t) - \zeta (h_t, \zeta_t),$$  

(2.21)

where

$$\zeta (h_t, \zeta_t) = \log \left[ h_t \left( e^{F + \zeta_t (1 + \sigma_L) f (h_t, \zeta_t) m_t^{\sigma_L}} - 1 \right) + 1 \right] - \frac{\sigma_t^2 \left( 1 + \sigma_L \right)}{2 \sigma_L + 1} f (h_t, \zeta_t)^{2 \sigma_L + 1} - \eta \zeta \sigma_L f (h_t, \zeta_t)^{\sigma_L + 1}. $$  

(2.22)

In (2.22) the function, $f$, is defined in (2.13).
We now briefly discuss expression (2.21). First, note that the derivation of the utility function, (2.21), involves no maximization problem by the family. This is because the family incentive and resource constraints, (2.9) and (2.18), are sufficient to determine $c^w_t$ and $c^{nw}_t$ conditional on $h_t$ and $C_t$. In general, the constraints would not be sufficient to determine the household consumption allocations, and the family problem would involve non-trivial optimization. Second, we can see from (2.21) that our model is likely to be characterized by a particular observational equivalence property. To see this, note that although the agents in our model are in fact heterogeneous, $C_t$ and $h_t$ are chosen as if the economy were populated by a representative agent with the utility function specified in (2.21). A model such as CGG, which specifies representative agent utility as the sum of the log of consumption and a constant elasticity disutility of labor is indistinguishable from our model, as long as data on the labor force and unemployment are not used. This is particularly obvious if, as is the case here, we only study the linearized dynamics of the model about steady state. In this case, the only properties of a model’s utility function that are used are its second order derivative properties in nonstochastic steady state. This observational equivalence result reflects our simplifying assumptions. These assumptions are primarily driven by the desire for analytic tractability, so that the economics of the environment are as transparent as possible. Presumably, a careful analysis of microeconomic data would lead to different functional forms and the resulting model would then not be observationally equivalent to the standard model.

Our model and the standard CGG model are distinguished by two features. First, our model addresses a larger set of time series than the standard model does. Second, in our model the representative agent’s utility function is a reduced form object. Its properties are determined by details of the technology of job search, and by cross-sectional variation in preferences with regard to attitudes about market work. As a result, the basic structure of the utility function in our model can in principle be informed by time use surveys and studies of job search.\textsuperscript{19}

With the representative family’s utility function in hand, we are in a position to state the necessary conditions for optimization by the representative family:

\begin{equation}
\frac{1}{C_t} = \beta E_t \frac{1}{C_{t+1}} \frac{R_t}{\sigma_{t+1}}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
C_t z_t (h_t, s_t) = \frac{W_t}{P_t}.
\end{equation}

\textsuperscript{19}A similar point was made by Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991). They argue that a representative agent utility function of consumption and labor should be interpreted as a reduced form object, after non-market consumption and labor activities have been maximized out. From this perspective, construction of the representative agent’s utility function can in principle be guided by surveys of how time in the home is used.
Here, $\pi_{t+1}$ is the gross rate of inflation from $t$ to $t+1$. The expression to the left of the equality in (2.24) is the family’s marginal cost in consumption units of providing an extra unit of market employment. This marginal cost takes into account the need for the family to provide appropriate incentives to increase employment. A cost of the incentives, which involves increasing the consumption differential between employed and non-employed households, is that consumption insurance to family members is reduced.

2.2. Goods Production and Price Setting

Production is standard in our model. Accordingly, we suppose that a final good, $Y_t$, is produced using a continuum of inputs as follows:

$$Y_t = \left[ \int_0^1 Y_{t,i}^{\lambda_f} di \right]^{\lambda_f}, \quad 1 \leq \lambda_f < \infty. \tag{2.25}$$

The good is produced by a competitive, representative firm which takes the price of output, $P_t$, and the price of inputs, $P_{i,t}$, as given. The first order necessary condition associated with optimization is:

$$\mu \frac{P_t}{P_{i,t}} \frac{\partial}{\partial P_t} Y_t = Y_{i,t}. \tag{2.26}$$

A useful result is obtained by substituting out for $Y_{i,t}$ in (2.25) from (2.26):

$$P_t = \left[ \int_0^1 (P_{i,t})^{\lambda_f} di \right]^{-(\lambda_f - 1)}. \tag{2.27}$$

Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolist using the following production function:

$$Y_{i,t} = A_i h_{i,t},$$

where $A_i$ is an exogenous stochastic process whose growth rate,

$$g_{A_i} \equiv \frac{A_i}{A_{i-1}},$$

is stationary. The marginal cost of the $i^{th}$ firm is, after dividing by $P_t$:

$$s_t = (1 - \nu) \frac{W_t}{A_i P_t} = (1 - \nu) \frac{C_t z_h (h_t, s_t)}{A_t}, \tag{2.28}$$

after using (2.24) to substitute out for $W_t/P_t$. Here, $\nu$ is a subsidy designed to remove the effects, in steady state, of monopoly power. To this end, we set

$$1 - \nu = \frac{1}{\lambda_f}. \tag{2.29}$$
Monopolists are subject to Calvo price frictions. In particular, a fraction $\xi_p$ of intermediate good firms cannot change price:

$$P_{i,t} = P_{i,t-1}, \quad (2.30)$$

and the complementary fraction, $1 - \xi_p$, set their price optimally:

$$P_{i,t} = \tilde{P}_t.$$

The $i^{th}$ monopolist that has the opportunity to reoptimize its price in the current period is only concerned about future histories in which it cannot reoptimize its price. This leads to the following problem:

$$\max_{P_t} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\xi_p \beta)^j v_{t+j} \left[ \tilde{P}_t \delta_{t+j} Y_{i,t+j} - P_{t+j} \delta_{t+j} Y_{i,t+j} \right], \quad (2.31)$$

subject to (2.26). In (2.31), $v_t$ is the multiplier on the representative family’s time $t$ flow budget constraint, (2.2), in the Lagrangian representation of its problem. Intermediate good firms take $v_{t+j}$ as given. The nature of the family’s preferences, (2.21), implies:

$$v_{t+j} = \frac{1}{P_{t+j} C_{t+j}}.$$

### 2.3. Market Clearing, Aggregate Resources and Equilibrium

Clearing in the loan market requires $B_{t+1} = 0$. Clearing in the market for final goods requires:

$$C_t + G_t = Y_t, \quad (2.32)$$

where $G_t$ denotes government consumption. We model $G_t$ as follows:

$$G_t = g_t N_t, \quad (2.33)$$

where $\log g_t$ is a stationary stochastic process independent of any other shocks in the system, such as $A_t$. The variable, $N_t$, appears in (2.33) in order to ensure that the model exhibits balanced growth, and has the following representation:

$$N_t = A_t^\gamma N_{t-1}^{1-\gamma}, \quad 0 < \gamma \leq 1.$$

In the extreme case, $\gamma = 1$, (2.33) reduces to the model of $G_t$ proposed in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). That model implies, implausibly, that $G_t$ responds immediately to a shock in $A_t$. With $\gamma$ close to zero, $G_t$ is proportional to a long average of past values of
$A_t$, and the immediate impact of a disturbance in $A_t$ on $G_t$ is arbitrarily small. For any admissible value of $\gamma$, 
\[ n_t \equiv \frac{N_t}{A_t}, \] 
converges in nonstochastic steady state. The law of motion of $n_t$ is:
\[ n_t = \left( \frac{n_{t-1}}{g_{A,t}} \right)^{1-\gamma}. \]

The relationship between aggregate output of the final good, $Y_t$, and aggregate employment, $h_t$, is given by (see Yun, 1996):
\[ Y_t = p_t^* A_t h_t, \]
where
\[ p_t^* = \left( \frac{P_t^*}{P_t} \right)^{\frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_t - 1}}, \quad P_t^* = \left[ \int_0^1 P_{i,t}^{\frac{\lambda_t}{\lambda_t - 1}} \, di \right]^{\frac{1}{\lambda_t - 1}}. \]

The model is closed once we specify how monetary policy is conducted and time series representations for the shocks. A sequence of markets equilibrium is a stochastic process for prices and quantities which satisfies market clearing and optimality conditions for the agents in the model.

2.4. Log-Linearizing the Private Sector Equilibrium Conditions

It is convenient to express the equilibrium conditions in linearized form relative to the ‘efficient’ equilibrium. We define the efficient equilibrium as the one in which $\pi_t = 1$ for all $t$, monopoly power does not distort the level of employment, and there are no price frictions. We refer to the equilibrium in our market economy with sticky prices as simply the ‘equilibrium’, or the ‘actual equilibrium’ when clarity requires special emphasis.

2.4.1. The Efficient Equilibrium

In the efficient equilibrium, the marginal cost of labor and the marginal product of labor are equated:
\[ C_t z_h (h_t, \zeta_t) = A_t. \]
The resource constraint in the efficient equilibrium is $C_t + G_t = A_t h_t$, which, when substituted into the previous expression implies:
\[ (h_t^* - g_t n_t) z_h (h_t^*, \zeta_t) = 1, \]
where the ‘*’ indicates an endogenous variable in the efficient equilibrium. Evidently, the efficient level of employment, $h_t^*$, fluctuates in response to disturbances in $g_t$ and $\zeta_t$. It also
responds to disturbances in $g_{A,t}$ in the plausible case, $\gamma < 1$. The level of work in the nonstochastic steady state of the efficient equilibrium coincides with the level of work in the nonstochastic steady state of the actual equilibrium. This object is denoted by $h$ in both cases. The values of all variables in nonstochastic steady state coincide across actual and efficient equilibria.

Linearizing (2.37) about steady state,
\[
\hat{h}_t^* = \frac{\eta_t}{1-\eta_t} \left( \hat{g}_t + \hat{n}_t \right) - \sigma_z \hat{z}_t = \frac{\eta_t}{1 + (1 - \eta_t) \sigma_z} \left( \hat{g}_t + \hat{n}_t \right) - \frac{1 - \eta_t}{1 + (1 - \eta_t) \sigma_z} \sigma_z \hat{z}_t, \tag{2.38}
\]
where
\[
\sigma_z = \frac{z_{hh} h}{z_h}, \quad \sigma_z = \frac{z_{hz} \zeta}{z_h}, \tag{2.39}
\]
$\eta_t$ denotes the steady state value of $G_t / Y_t$, and
\[
\hat{n}_t = (1 - \gamma) \left( \hat{n}_{t-1} - \hat{g}_{A,t} \right). \tag{2.40}
\]
In (2.39), $z_{ij}$ denotes the cross derivative of $z$ with respect to $i$ and $j$ ($i, j = h, \zeta$), evaluated in steady state and $z_h$ denotes the derivative of $z$ with respect to $h$, evaluated in steady state. We follow the convention that a hat over a variable denotes percent deviation from its steady state value.

The object, $\sigma_z$, is a measure of the curvature of the function, $z$, in the neighborhood of steady state. Also, $1/\sigma_z$ is a consumption-compensated elasticity of family labor supply in steady state. Although $1/\sigma_z$ bears a formal similarity to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, there is an important distinction. In practice the Frisch elasticity refers to a household’s willingness to change its labor supply on the intensive margin in response to a wage change. In our environment, all changes in labor supply occur on the extensive margin.

The efficient rate of interest, $R_t^*$, is derived from (2.23) with consumption and inflation set at their efficient rates:
\[
R_t^* = \frac{1}{\beta E_t \left[ g_{A,t+1} (h_{t+1}^* - g_{A,t+1} + g_{A,t+1} + m_{t+1}) \right]}.
\]
Linearizing the efficient rate of interest expression about steady state, we obtain:
\[
\hat{R}_t^* = E_t \hat{g}_{A,t+1} + \frac{1}{1 - \eta_t} E_t \left( \hat{h}_{t+1}^* - \hat{h}_t^* \right) - \eta_t \frac{\hat{R}_t^*}{1 - \eta_t} E_t \left[ (\hat{g}_{t+1} + \hat{n}_{t+1} - (\hat{g}_t + \hat{n}_t) \right], \tag{2.41}
\]
where $\hat{h}_{t+1}^*$, $\hat{h}_t^*$ are defined in (2.38).
2.4.2. The Actual Equilibrium

We turn now to the linearized equilibrium conditions in the actual equilibrium. The monetary policy rule (displayed below) ensures that inflation and, hence, price dispersion, is zero in the steady state. Yun (1996) showed that under these circumstances, \( p_t^* \) in (2.35) is unity to first order, so that

\[
\frac{C_t}{A_t} = \frac{h_t A_t - g_t n_t A_t}{A_t} = h_t - g_t n_t. \tag{2.42}
\]

Linearizing (2.28) about the non-stochastic steady state equilibrium and using (2.42), we obtain:

\[
\hat{s}_t = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta_g} + \sigma_z \right) \hat{h}_t - \left[ \frac{\eta_g}{1 - \eta_g} (\hat{g}_t + \hat{n}_t) - \sigma_z \hat{s}_t \right] = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta_g} + \sigma_z \right) (\hat{h}_t - \hat{h}_t^*),
\]

using (2.38). Then,

\[
\hat{s}_t = \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta_g} + \sigma_z \right) \hat{x}_t, \tag{2.43}
\]

where \( \hat{x}_t \) denotes the ‘output gap’, the percent deviation of actual output from its value in the efficient equilibrium:

\[
\hat{x}_t \equiv \hat{h}_t - \hat{h}_t^*. \tag{2.44}
\]

Condition (2.27), together with the necessary conditions associated with (2.31) leads (after linearization about a zero inflation steady state) to:

\[
\hat{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} + \frac{(1 - \beta \xi_p) (1 - \xi_p)}{\xi_p} \left( \frac{1}{1 - \eta_g} + \sigma_z \right) \hat{x}_t. \tag{2.45}
\]

The derivation of (2.45) is standard, but is included in appendix A in this paper’s technical appendix for completeness.

The family’s intertemporal Euler equation, (2.23), after using (2.42), can be expressed as follows:

\[
1 = \beta E_t \frac{h_t - g_t n_t}{(h_{t+1} - g_{t+1} n_{t+1}) g_{A,t+1} \pi_{t+1}} R_t.
\]

Linearize this around steady state, to obtain:

\[
\hat{h}_t = \eta_g [(\hat{g}_t + \hat{n}_t) - (\hat{g}_{t+1} + \hat{n}_{t+1})] + \hat{h}_{t+1} + (1 - \eta_g) \hat{g}_{A,t+1} - (1 - \eta_g) \left( \hat{R}_t - \hat{\pi}_{t+1} \right).
\]

Use (2.41) to solve out for \( (1 - \eta_g) \hat{g}_{A,t+1} \) in the preceding expression, to obtain:

\[
\hat{x}_t = E_t \hat{x}_{t+1} - (1 - \eta_g) E_t \left( \hat{R}_t - \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{R}_t^* \right). \tag{2.46}
\]

Expression (2.46) is the standard representation of the ‘New Keynesian IS’ curve, expressed in terms of the output gap, \( \hat{x}_t \), and the efficient rate of interest, \( \hat{R}_t^* \).
The model is closed with the assumption that monetary policy follows a Taylor rule of the following form:

$$\hat{R}_t = \rho_R \hat{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_R) [r_x \hat{\pi}_t + r_y \hat{x}_t] + \varepsilon_t,$$  

(2.47)

where $\varepsilon_t$ is an iid monetary policy shock. The equilibrium conditions of the log-linearized system are (2.38), (2.40), (2.41), (2.45), (2.46), and (2.47). These conditions determine the equilibrium stochastic processes, $\hat{h}^*_t$, $\hat{n}_t$, $\hat{\pi}_t$, $\hat{x}_t$ and $\hat{\xi}_t$ as a function of the exogenous stochastic processes, $\hat{g}_A, \hat{g}_I, \hat{g}_t, \hat{\xi}_{t}$ and $\varepsilon_t$. The first three stochastic processes enter the system via the efficient rate of interest and employment as indicated in (2.38) and (2.41), and the monetary policy shock enters via (2.47). The variables, $\hat{h}_t$, can be solved using (2.38) and (2.44).

The model parameters that enter the equilibrium conditions are $\gamma$, $\eta$, $\sigma_z$, $\sigma_x$, $\xi_p$ and $\beta$. Consistent with the observational equivalence discussion after (2.21), there is no way, absent observations on unemployment and the labor force, to tell whether these parameters are the ones associated with CGG or with our involuntary unemployment model. Thus, relative to time series on the six variables, $\hat{h}^*_t$, $\hat{\pi}_t$, $\hat{x}_t$, $\hat{h}_t$, and $\hat{\xi}_t$, our model and the standard CGG model are observationally equivalent.

2.5. The NAIRU

We can solve for the labor force and unemployment from (2.16) and (2.12). Linearizing (2.12) about steady state, we obtain

$$\hat{m}_t = \frac{1 - u}{1 - \alpha^2 \sigma_L^2 m^\sigma_L} \hat{h}_t - \delta_\zeta \hat{\zeta}_t,$$  

(2.48)

where

$$\delta_\zeta \equiv \frac{\eta}{1 - \alpha^2 \sigma_L^2 m^\sigma_L} > 0.$$  

(2.49)

Linearizing (2.17):

$$du_t = -a^2 \sigma_L m^\sigma_L [\sigma_L \hat{m}_t + \hat{\zeta}_t],$$

where

$$du_t \equiv u_t - u.$$  

To see this, note from (2.12):

$$h \hat{h}_t = \eta m \hat{m}_t + a^2 \sigma_L m^{\sigma_L + 1} [\sigma_L + 1] \hat{m}_t + \hat{\zeta}_t

= [\eta m + (h - m\eta)(\sigma_L + 1)] \hat{m}_t + (h - m\eta) \hat{\zeta}_t.$$  

Then, divide by $h$ and rearrange using the identity, $u = 1 - h/m$. Finally, replace $1 - \eta - u$ in this expression with $a^2 \sigma_L m^{\sigma_L}$ using the steady state version of (2.17) in the text.
and \( u_t \) is a small deviation from steady state unemployment, \( u \). Substituting from (2.48),

\[
u_t = u - \kappa^{\text{okun}} \hat{h}_t - a^2 \zeta \sigma_L m^{\sigma_L} (1 - \sigma_L \delta_c) \hat{\zeta}_t,
\]

where

\[
\kappa^{\text{okun}} = \frac{a^2 \zeta \sigma_L^2 m^{\sigma_L} (1 - u)}{1 - u + a^2 \zeta \sigma_L^2 m^{\sigma_L}} > 0.
\]

The analogous equation holds in the efficient equilibrium, with \( \hat{h}_t \) replaced by \( \hat{h}_t^* \):

\[
u_t^* = u - \kappa^{\text{okun}} \hat{h}_t^* - a^2 \zeta \sigma_L m^{\sigma_L} (1 - \sigma_L \delta_c) \hat{\zeta}_t.
\]

Here, the notation reflects that the steady states in the actual and efficient equilibria coincide. In (2.51), \( u_t^* \) denotes unemployment in the efficient equilibrium, i.e., the efficient rate of unemployment. The coefficients on \( \hat{\zeta}_t \) in (2.50) and (2.51) are positive, because \( \sigma_L \delta_c < 1 \).

Let \( u_t^g \) denote the 'unemployment gap'. Subtracting (2.51) from (2.50), we obtain:

\[
u_t^g \equiv u_t - u_t^* = -\kappa^{\text{okun}} \hat{x}_t.
\]

Note that the unemployment gap is the level deviation of the unemployment rate in the actual equilibrium from the efficient rate. The notation is chosen to emphasize that (2.52) represents the model’s implication for Okun’s law. In particular, a one percentage point rise in the unemployment rate above the efficient rate is associated with a \( 1/\kappa^{\text{okun}} \) percent fall in output relative to its efficient level. The general view is that \( 1/\kappa^{\text{okun}} \) is somewhere in the range, 2 to 3.

The model can be rewritten in terms of the unemployment gap instead of the output gap. Substituting (2.52) into (2.45), (2.46) and (2.47), respectively, we obtain:

\[
\hat{\pi}_t = \beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \kappa u_t^g
\]

\[
u_t^g = \kappa^{\text{okun}} E_t u_t^g + \kappa^{\text{okun}} \left( \hat{R}_t - \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{\pi}_t^* \right)
\]

\[
\hat{R}_t = \rho_R \hat{R}_{t-1} + (1 - \rho_R) \left[ \frac{r_p}{\kappa^{\text{okun}}} \hat{\pi}_t - \frac{r_g}{\kappa^{\text{okun}}} u_t^g \right] + \varepsilon_t
\]

where

\[
\kappa \equiv \frac{(1 - \beta \xi_p) (1 - \xi_p)}{\xi_p} \frac{1 + \sigma_z}{\kappa^{\text{okun}}}
\]

This is the expression Stock and Watson (1999) refer to as the unemployment rate Phillips curve.

\[21\text{To see this, note}
\]

\[
\frac{\eta \sigma_L}{1 - u + a^2 \zeta \sigma_L^2 m^{\sigma_L}} = \frac{(1 - u - a^2 \zeta \sigma_L m^{\sigma_L}) \sigma_L}{1 - u + a^2 \zeta \sigma_L^2 m^{\sigma_L}} < 1
\]
We can relate the theory derived here to the idea of a non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU). One interpretation of the NAIRU focuses on the first difference of inflation. Under this interpretation, the NAIRU is a level of unemployment such that whenever the actual unemployment rate lies below it, inflation is predicted to accelerate and whenever the actual unemployment rate is above it, inflation is predicted to decelerate. The efficient level of unemployment, $u^*_t$, does not in general satisfy this definition of the NAIRU. From (2.53) it is evident that a negative value of $u^0_t$ does not predict an acceleration of inflation in the sense of predicting a positive value for

$$\beta E_t \hat{\pi}_{t+1} - \hat{\pi}_t.$$  

(2.56)

On the contrary, according to the unemployment rate Phillips curve, (2.53), a negative value of $u^0_t$ creates an anticipated deceleration in inflation.\(^{22}\) Testing this implication of the data empirically is difficult, because $u^*_t$ is not an observed variable. However, some insight can be gained if one places upper and lower bounds on $u^*_t$. For example, suppose $u^*_t \in (4, 8)$. That is, the efficient unemployment rate in the postwar US was never below 4 percent or above 8 percent. In the 593 months between February 1960 and July 2009, the unemployment rate was below 4 percent in 52 months and above 8 percent in 42 months. Of the months in which unemployment was above its upper threshold, the change in inflation from that month to three months later was negative 79 percent of the time. Of the months in which unemployment was below the 4 percent lower threshold, the corresponding change in inflation was positive 67 percent of the time. If one accepts our assumption about the bounds on $u^*_t$, these results lend empirical support to the proposition that there exists a NAIRU in the first difference sense. They also represent evidence against the model developed here.\(^{23}\)

An alternative interpretation of the NAIRU focuses on the level of inflation, rather than its change. Under this interpretation, $u^*_t$ in the theory developed here is a NAIRU.\(^{24}\) To see this, one must take into account that the theory (sensibly) implies that inflation returns to steady state after a shock that causes $u^0_t$ to drop has disappeared. That is, the eventual

\(^{22}\)In their discussion of the NAIRU, Ball and Mankiw (2002) implicitly reject (2.53) as a foundation for the notion that $u^*_t$ is a NAIRU. Their discussion begins under a slightly different version of (2.53), with $\beta E_t \tilde{u}_{t+1}$ replaced by $E_{t-1} \tilde{\pi}_t$. They take the position that $u^*_t$ in this framework is a NAIRU only when monetary policy generates the random walk outcome, $E_{t-1} \tilde{\pi}_t = \tilde{\pi}_{t-1}$. In this case, a negative value of $u^0_t$ is associated with a deceleration of current inflation relative to what it was in the previous period. Ball and Mankiw argue that the random walk case is actually the relevant one for the US in recent decades.

\(^{23}\)Our bounds test follows the one implemented in Stiglitz (1997) and was executed as follows. Monthly observations on the unemployment and the consumer price index were taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ online data base, FRED. We worked with the raw unemployment rate. The consumer price index was logged, and we computed a year-over-year rate of inflation rate, $\pi_t$. The percentages reported in the text represent the fraction of times that $u_t < 4$ and $\pi_{t+3} - \pi_t > 0$, and the fraction of times that $u_t > 8$ and $\pi_{t+3} - \pi_t < 0$.

\(^{24}\)In his discussion of the NAIRU, Stiglitz (1997) appears to be open to either the first difference or level interpretation of the NAIRU.

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effect on inflation of a negative shock to $u_t^g$ must be zero. That a negative shock to $u_t^g$ also creates the expectation of a deceleration in inflation then implies that inflation converges back to steady state from above after a negative shock to $u_t^g$. That is, a shock that drives $u_t$ below $u_t^*$ is expected to be followed by a higher level of inflation and a shock that drives $u_t$ above $u_t^*$ is expected to be followed by a lower level of inflation.\(^{25}\)

Thus, $u_t^*$ in the theory derived here is a NAIRU if one adopts the level interpretation of the NAIRU and not if one adopts the first difference interpretation. Interestingly, $u_t^*$ is a NAIRU under the first difference interpretation if one adopts the price indexation scheme proposed in CEE, in which (2.30) is replaced by

$$P_{t,t} = \pi_{t-1} P_{t-1,t-1}.$$ 

In this case, $\hat{\pi}_t$ and $\hat{\pi}_{t+1}$ in (2.53) are replaced by their first differences. Retracing the logic of the previous two paragraphs establishes that with price indexation, $u_t^*$ is a NAIRU in the first difference sense. Under our assumptions about the bounds on $u_t^*$, price indexation also improves the empirical performance of the model on the dimensions emphasized here.

It is instructive to consider the implications of the theory for the regression of the period $t+1$ inflation rate on the period $t$ unemployment and inflation rates. In the very special case that $u_t^*$ is a constant, the regression coefficient on $u_t$ would be $\kappa$ and other variables would not add to the forecast.\(^{26}\) However, these predictions depend crucially on the assumption that $u_t^*$ is constant. If it is stochastic, then $u_t^*$ is part of the error term. Since $u_t^*$ is expected to be correlated with all other variables in the model, then adding these variables to the forecast equation is predicted to improve fit.

\(^{25}\)A quick way to formally verify the convergence properties just described is to consider the following example. Suppose the monetary policy shock, $\varepsilon_t$, is an iid stochastic process. Let the response of the endogenous variables to $\varepsilon_t$ be given by

$$u_t^g = u_t \varepsilon_t, \quad \hat{R}_t = R_t \varepsilon_t, \quad \hat{\pi}_t = \pi_t \varepsilon_t,$$

where $u_t$, $R_t$ and $\pi_t$ are undetermined coefficients to be solved for. Substituting these into the equations that characterize equilibrium and imposing that the equations must be satisfied for every realization of $\varepsilon_t$, we find:

$$u_t \varepsilon = \frac{\kappa \varepsilon}{1 + \kappa \varepsilon \gamma + r_y}, \quad \pi_t = -\kappa u_t \varepsilon, \quad R_t = \frac{1}{\kappa \varepsilon} u_t \varepsilon.$$ 

According to these expressions, a monetary policy shock drives $u_t^g$ and $R_t$ in the same direction. Thus, a monetary policy shock that drives the interest rate down also drives the unemployment gap down. The same shock drives current inflation up.

\(^{26}\)In our model, $u_t^*$ is constant only under very special circumstances. For example, it is constant if government spending is zero and the labor preference shock, $\zeta_t$, is constant. However, as explained after (2.37), $u_t^*$ is a function of all three shocks when government spending is positive and $\gamma < 1$. 

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3. Integrating Unemployment into a Medium-Sized DSGE Model

Our representation of the ‘standard DSGE model’ is a version of the medium-sized DSGE model in CEE or Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). The first section below describes how we introduce our model of involuntary unemployment into the standard model. The last section derives the standard model as a special case of our model.

3.1. Final and Intermediate Goods

A final good is produced by competitive firms using (2.25). The \( \Psi_t \) intermediate good is produced by a monopolist with the following production function:

\[
\Phi_t = \left( \zeta_t \Psi_t \right)^{1-\alpha} K^{\alpha}_{i,t} \theta_t, \tag{3.1}
\]

where \( K_{i,t} \) denotes capital services used for production by the \( i^{th} \) intermediate good producer. Also, \( \log (\zeta_t) \) is a technology shock whose first difference has a positive mean and \( \phi \) denotes a fixed production cost. The economy has two sources of growth: the positive drift in \( \log (\zeta_t) \) and a positive drift in \( \log (\Psi_t) \), where \( \Psi_t \) is the state of an investment-specific technology shock discussed below. The object, \( z_t^+ \), in (3.1) is defined as follows:

\[
z_t^+ = \Psi_t \alpha z_t^+. \tag{3.2}
\]

Along a non-stochastic steady state growth path, \( Y_t / z_t^+ \) and \( Y_{i,t} / z_t^+ \) converge to constants. The two shocks, \( z_t \) and \( \Psi_t \), are specified to be unit root processes in order to be consistent with the assumptions we use in our VAR analysis to identify the dynamic response of the economy to neutral and capital-embodied technology shocks. The two shocks have the following time series representations:

\[
\Delta \log z_t = \mu_z + \varepsilon_n^{\mu}, \quad E (\varepsilon_n^{\mu})^2 = (\sigma_n)^2
\]
\[
\Delta \log \Psi_t = \mu_{\psi} + \rho_{\psi} \Delta \log \Psi_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{\psi}^{\mu}, \quad E (\varepsilon_{\psi}^{\mu})^2 = (\sigma_{\psi})^2. \tag{3.3}
\]

Our assumption that the neutral technology shock follows a random walk with drift matches closely the finding in Smets and Wouters (2007) who estimate \( \log z_t \) to be highly autocorrelated. The direct empirical analysis of Prescott (1986) also supports the notion that \( \log z_t \) is a random walk with drift.

In (3.1), \( H_{i,t} \) denotes homogeneous labor services hired by the \( i^{th} \) intermediate good producer. Intermediate good firms must borrow the wage bill in advance of production, so that one unit of labor costs is given by

\[
W_t R_t,
\]

21
\( R_t \) denotes the gross nominal rate of interest. Intermediate good firms are subject to Calvo price-setting frictions. With probability \( \xi_p \) the intermediate good firm cannot reoptimize its price, in which case it is assumed to set its price according to the following rule:

\[
P_{i,t} = \bar{\pi} P_{i,t-1},
\]

where \( \bar{\pi} \) is the steady state inflation rate. With probability \( 1 - \xi_p \) the intermediate good firm can reoptimize its price. Apart from the fixed cost, the \( i^{th} \) intermediate good producer’s profits are:

\[
E_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \beta^j v_{t+j} \{ P_{i,t+j} Y_{i,t+j} - s_{t+j} P_{t+j} Y_{i,t+j} \},
\]

where \( s_t \) denotes the marginal cost of production, denominated in units of the homogeneous good. The object, \( s_t \), is a function only of the costs of capital and labor, and is described in the technical appendix, section E. In the firm’s discounted profits, \( \beta^j v_{t+j} \) is the multiplier on the family’s nominal period \( t + j \) budget constraint. The equilibrium conditions associated with this optimization problem are reported in section E of the technical appendix.

We suppose that the homogeneous labor hired by intermediate good producers is itself ‘produced’ by competitive labor contractors. Labor contractors produce homogeneous labor by aggregating different types of specialized labor, \( j \in (0,1) \), as follows:

\[
H_t = \left[ \int_0^1 (h_{t,j}) \bar{w} \;dj \right]^{\lambda_w}, \; 1 \leq \lambda_w < \infty.
\]

Labor contractors take the wage rate of \( H_t \) and \( h_{t,j} \) as given and equal to \( W_t \) and \( W_{t,j} \), respectively. Profit maximization by labor contractors leads to the following first order necessary condition:

\[
W_{j,t} = W_t \left( \frac{H_t}{h_{t,j}} \right)^{\frac{\lambda_w - 1}{\lambda_w}}.
\]

Equation (3.6) is the demand curve for the \( j^{th} \) type of labor.

### 3.2. Family and Household Preferences

We integrate the model of unemployment in the previous section into the Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) (EHL) model of sticky wages used in the standard DSGE model. Each type, \( j \in [0,1] \), of labor is assumed to be supplied by a particular family of households. The \( j^{th} \) family resembles the single representative family in the previous section, with one exception. The exception is that the unit measure of households in the \( j^{th} \) family is only able to supply the \( j^{th} \) type of labor service. Each household in the \( j^{th} \) family has the utility
cost of working, (2.3), and the technology for job search, (2.5). The five parameters of these functions are

\[ F, \zeta_t, \sigma_L, \alpha, \eta, \]

where the first three pertain to the cost of working and the last two pertain to job search. In the analysis of the empirical model, the preference shock, \( \zeta_t \), is constant. We assume that these parameters are identical across families. In order that the representative family in the current section have habit persistence in consumption, we change the way consumption enters the additive utility function of the household. In particular, we replace \( \log (c_{it}^{nw}) \) and \( \log (c_{it}^{n}) \) everywhere in the previous section with

\[ \log \left( c_{jt}^{nw} - bC_{t-1} \right), \quad \log \left( c_{jt}^{w} - bC_{t-1} \right), \]

respectively. Here, \( C_{t-1} \) denotes the family’s previous period’s level of consumption. When the parameter, \( b \), is positive, then each household in the family has habit in consumption. Also, \( c_{jt}^{nw} \) and \( c_{jt}^{w} \) denote the consumption levels allocated by the \( j^{th} \) family to non-employed and employed households within the family. Although families all enjoy the same level of consumption, \( C_t \), for reasons described momentarily each family experiences a different level of employment, \( h_{jt} \). Because employment across families is different, each type \( j \) family chooses a different way to balance the trade-off between the need for consumption insurance and the need to provide work incentives. For the \( j^{th} \) type of family with high \( h_{jt} \), the premium of consumption for working households to non-working households must be high. It is easy to verify that the incentive constraint in the version of the model considered here is the analog of (2.9):

\[ \log \left( \frac{c_{jt}^{w} - bC_{t-1}}{c_{jt}^{nw} - bC_{t-1}} \right) = F + \zeta (1 + \sigma_L) m_{jt}^{\sigma_L}, \]

where \( m_{jt} \) solves the analog of (2.12):

\[ h_{jt} = m_{jt} \eta + \alpha^2 \sigma_L m_{jt}^{\sigma_L+1}. \quad (3.7) \]

Consider the \( j^{th} \) family that enjoys a level of family consumption and employment, \( C_t \) and \( h_{jt} \), respectively. It is readily verified that the utility of this family, after it efficiently allocates consumption across its member households subject to the private information constraints, is given by:

\[ u \left( C_t - bC_{t-1}, h_{jt} \right) = \log \left( C_t - bC_{t-1} \right) - z \left( h_{jt} \right), \quad (3.8) \]

where the \( z \) function in (3.8) is defined in (2.22) with \( \zeta_t \) replaced by \( \zeta \). The \( j^{th} \) family’s discounted utility is:

\[ E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u \left( C_t - bC_{t-1}, h_{jt} \right). \quad (3.9) \]
Note that this utility function is additively separable, like the utility functions assumed for the households. Additive separability is convenient because perfect consumption insurance at the level of families implies that consumption is not indexed by labor type, $j$. As we show later, this simplification appears not to have come at a cost in terms of accounting for aggregate data. Still, it would be interesting to explore the implications of non-separable utility. The technical appendix to this paper derives (3.8) for two non-separable specifications of utility for households. Moreover, Guerron-Quintana (2008) shows how to handle the fact that family consumption is now indexed by $j$.

3.3. The Family Problem

The $j^{th}$ family is the monopoly supplier of the $j^{th}$ type of labor service. The family understands that when it arranges work incentives for its households so that employment is $h_{j,t}$, then $W_{j,t}$ takes on the value implied by the demand for its type of labor, (3.6). The family therefore faces the standard monopoly problem of selecting $W_{j,t}$ to optimize the welfare, (3.9), of its member households. It does so, subject to the requirement that it satisfy the demand for labor, (3.6), in each period. We follow EHL in supposing that the family experiences Calvo-style frictions in its choice of $W_{j,t}$. In particular, with probability $1 - \xi_{w}$ the $j^{th}$ family has the opportunity to reoptimize its wage rate. With the complementary probability, the family must set its wage rate according to the following rule:

$$
W_{j,t} = \tilde{\pi}_{w,t} W_{j,t-1}
$$

$$
\tilde{\pi}_{w,t} = (\pi_{t-1})^{\kappa_{w}} (\tilde{\pi})^{(1-\kappa_{w})} \mu_{z+},
$$

where $\kappa_{w} \in (0, 1)$. Note that in a non-stochastic steady state, non-optimizing families raise their real wage at the rate of growth of the economy. Because optimizing families also do this in steady state, it follows that in the steady state, the wage of each type of family is the same.

In principle, the presence of wage setting frictions implies that families have idiosyncratic levels of wealth and, hence, consumption. However, we follow EHL in supposing that each family has access to perfect consumption insurance. At the level of the family, there is no private information about consumption or employment. The private information and associated incentive problems all exist among the households inside a family. Because of the additive separability of the family utility function, perfect consumption insurance at the level of families implies equal consumption across families. We have used this property of the equilibrium to simplify our notation and not include a subscript, $j$, on the $j^{th}$ family’s consumption. Of course, we hasten to add that although consumption is equated across families, it is not constant across households.
The \( j \)th family’s period \( t \) budget constraint is as follows:

\[
P_t \left( C_t + \frac{1}{\Psi_t} I_t \right) + B_{t+1} \leq W_{t,j} h_{t,j} + X_{t}^k \bar{K}_t + R_{t-1} B_t + a_{jt}.
\]

Here, \( B_{t+1} \) denotes the quantity of risk-free bonds purchased by the household, \( R_t \) denotes the gross nominal interest rate on bonds purchased in period \( t - 1 \) which pay off in period \( t \), and \( a_{jt} \) denotes the payments and receipts associated with the insurance on the timing of wage reoptimization. Also, \( P_t \) denotes the aggregate price level and \( I_t \) denotes the quantity of investment goods purchased for augmenting the beginning-of-period \( t + 1 \) stock of physical capital, \( \bar{K}_{t+1} \). The price of investment goods is \( P_t / \Psi_t \), where \( \Psi_t \) is the unit root process with positive drift specified in (3.3). This is our way of capturing the trend decline in the relative price of investment goods.\(^{27}\)

The family owns the economy’s physical stock of capital, \( \bar{K}_t \), sets the utilization rate of capital and rents the services of capital in a competitive market. The family accumulates capital using the following technology:

\[
\bar{K}_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) \bar{K}_t + \left( 1 - S \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} \right) \right) I_t.
\]

Here, \( S \) is a convex function, with \( S \) and \( S' \) equal to zero on a steady state growth path. The function, \( S \), is defined in section H in the technical appendix. The function has one free parameter, its second derivative in the neighborhood of steady state, which we denote simply by \( S'' \).

For each unit of \( \bar{K}_{t+1} \) acquired in period \( t \), the family receives \( X_{t+1}^k \) in net cash payments in period \( t + 1 \),

\[
X_{t+1}^k = u_{t+1}^k P_{t+1} I_{t+1} - \frac{P_{t+1}}{\Psi_{t+1}} a(u_{t+1}^k).
\]

where \( u_{t+1}^k \) denotes the rate of utilization of capital. The first term in (3.14) is the gross nominal period \( t + 1 \) rental income from a unit of \( \bar{K}_{t+1} \). The family supply of capital services in period \( t + 1 \) is:

\[
K_{t+1} = u_{t+1}^k \bar{K}_{t+1}.
\]

It is the services of capital that intermediate good producers rent and use in their production functions, (3.1). The second term to the right of the equality in (3.14) represents the cost of capital utilization, \( a(u_{t+1}^k) P_{t+1} / \Psi_{t+1} \). See section H in the technical appendix for the functional form of the capital utilization cost function. This function is constructed so the

\(^{27}\)We suppose that there is an underlying technology for converting final goods, \( Y_t \), one-to-one into \( C_t \) and one to \( \Psi_t \) into investment goods. These technologies are operated by competitive firms which equate price to marginal cost. The marginal cost of \( C_t \) with this technology is \( P_t \) and the marginal cost of \( I_t \) is \( P_t / \Psi_t \). We avoid a full description of this environment so as to not clutter the presentation, and simply impose these properties of equilibrium on the family budget constraint.
steady state value of utilization is unity, and \( u(1) = u'(1) = 0 \). The function has one free parameter, which we denote by \( \sigma_a \). Here, \( \sigma_a = a''(1)/a' \) and corresponds to the curvature of \( u \) in steady state.

The family’s problem is to select sequences, \( \{C_t, I_t, u_t^k, W_{j,t}, B_{t+1}, \bar{K}_{t+1}\} \), to maximize (3.9) subject to (3.6), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14) and the mechanism determining when wages can be reoptimized. The equilibrium conditions associated with this maximization problem are standard, and so appear in section E of the technical appendix.

### 3.4. Aggregate Resource Constraint, Monetary Policy and Equilibrium

Goods market clearing dictates that the homogeneous output good is allocated among alternative uses as follows:

\[
Y_t = G_t + C_t + \bar{I}_t. \tag{3.15}
\]

Here, \( G_t \) denotes family consumption, \( C_t \) denotes exogenous government consumption and \( \bar{I}_t \) is a homogenous investment good which is defined as follows:

\[
\bar{I}_t = \frac{1}{\Psi_t} \left( I_t + a(u_t^k) \bar{K}_t \right). \tag{3.16}
\]

As discussed above, the investment goods, \( I_t \), are used by the families to add to the physical stock of capital, \( \bar{K}_t \), according to (3.13). The remaining investment goods are used to cover maintenance costs, \( a(u_t^k) \bar{K}_t \), arising from capital utilization, \( u_t^k \). Finally, \( \Psi_t \) in (3.16) denotes the unit root investment specific technology shock with positive drift discussed after (3.1).

We suppose that monetary policy follows a Taylor rule of the following form:

\[
\log \left( \frac{R_t}{R} \right) = \rho_R \log \left( \frac{R_{t-1}}{R} \right) + (1 - \rho_R) \left[ r : \pi_t \log \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \right) + r : \log \left( \frac{gdp_t}{gdp} \right) \right] + \varepsilon_{R,t}, \tag{3.17}
\]

where \( \varepsilon_{R,t} \) is an iid monetary policy shock. As in CEE and ACEL, we assume that period \( t \) realizations of \( \varepsilon_R \) are not included in the period \( t \) information set of households and firms. Further, \( gdp_t \) denotes scaled real GDP defined as:

\[
gdp_t = \frac{G_t + C_t + I_t/\Psi_t}{z_t^+}, \tag{3.18}
\]

and \( gdp \) denotes the nonstochastic steady state value of \( gdp_t \). We adopt the model of government spending suggested in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992):

\[
G_t = gz_t^+. \tag{3.19}
\]

Lump-sum transfers are assumed to balance the government budget.

An equilibrium is a stochastic process for the prices and quantities having the property that the family and firm problems are satisfied, and goods and labor markets clear.
3.5. Aggregate Labor Force and Unemployment in Our Model

We now derive our model’s implications for unemployment and the labor market. At the level of the $j^{th}$ family, unemployment and the labor force are defined in the same way as in the previous section, except that the endogenous variables now have a $j$ subscript (the parameters and shocks are the same across families). Thus, the $j^{th}$ family’s labor force, $m_{j,t}$, and total employment, $h_{j,t}$, are related by (2.12) (or, (3.7)). We linearize the latter expression as in (2.48):

$$
\hat{m}_{j,t} = \frac{1 - u}{1 - u + a^2\zeta^2 \sigma_L^2 \mu^2} \hat{h}_{j,t},
$$

though we ignore $\hat{\zeta}_t$. Also, $u$ and $m$ denote the steady state values of unemployment and the labor force in the $j^{th}$ family. Because we have made assumptions which guarantee that each family is identical in steady state, we drop the $j$ subscripts from all steady state labor market variables (see the discussion after (3.10)).

Aggregate household hours and the labor force are defined as follows:

$$
\tilde{h}_t \equiv \int_0^1 h_{j,t}dj, \quad m_t \equiv \int_0^1 m_{j,t}dj.
$$

Totally differentiating,

$$
\tilde{h}_t = \int_0^1 \tilde{h}_{j,t}dj, \quad \tilde{m}_t = \int_0^1 \tilde{m}_{j,t}dj.
$$

Using the fact that, to first order, type $j$ wage deviations from the aggregate wage cancel, we obtain:

$$
\tilde{h}_t = \hat{H}_t.
$$

See section G in the technical appendix for a derivation. That is, to a first order approximation, the percent deviation of aggregate household hours from steady state coincides with the percent deviation of aggregate homogeneous hours from steady state. Integrating (3.19) over all $j$:

$$
\hat{m}_t = \int_0^1 \hat{m}_{j,t}dj = \frac{1 - u}{1 - u + a^2\zeta^2 \sigma_L^2 \mu^2} \hat{H}_t.
$$

Aggregate unemployment is defined as follows:

$$
u_t \equiv \frac{m_t - h_t}{m_t},$$

so that

$$
du_t = \frac{h}{m} \left( \hat{m}_t - \hat{h}_t \right).
$$

Here, $du_t$ denotes the deviation of unemployment from its steady state value, not the percent deviation.
3.6. The Standard Model

We derive the utility function used in the standard model as a special case of the family utility function in our involuntary unemployment model. In part, we do this to ensure consistency across models. In part, we do this as a way of emphasizing that we interpret the labor input in the utility function in the standard model as corresponding to the number of people working, not, say, the hours worked of a representative person. With our interpretation, the curvature of the labor disutility function corresponds to the (consumption compensated) elasticity with which people enter or leave the labor force in response to a change in the wage rate. In particular, this curvature does not correspond to the elasticity with which the typical person adjusts the quantity of hours worked in response to a wage change. Empirically, the latter elasticity is estimated to be small and it is fixed at zero in the model.

Another advantage of deriving the standard model from ours is that it puts us in position to exploit an insight by Gali (2010). In particular, Gali (2010) shows that the standard model already has a theory of unemployment implicit in it. The monopoly power assumed by EHL has the consequence that wages are on average higher than what they would be under competition. The number of workers for which the wage is greater than the cost of work exceeds the number of people employed. Gali suggests defining this excess of workers as ‘unemployed’. The implied unemployment rate and labor force represent a natural benchmark to compare with our model.

Notably, deriving an unemployment rate and labor force in the standard model does not introduce any new parameters. Moreover, there is no change in the equilibrium conditions that determine non-labor market variables. Gali’s insight in effect simply adds a block recursive system of two equations to the standard DSGE model which determine the size of the labor force and unemployment. Although the unemployment rate derived in this way does not satisfy all the criteria for unemployment that we described in the introduction, it nevertheless provides a natural benchmark for comparison with our model. An extensive comparison of the economics of our approach to unemployment versus the approach implicit in the standard model appears in section F in the technical appendix to this paper.

We suppose that the family has full information about its member households and that households which join the labor force automatically receive a job without having to expend any effort. As in the previous subsections, we suppose that corresponding to each type \(j\) of labor, there is a unit measure of households which gather together into a family. At the beginning of each period, each household draws a random variable, \(l\), from a uniform distribution with support, \([0, 1]\). The random variable, \(l\), determines a household’s aversion to work according to (2.3), with \(F = 0\). The fact that no effort is needed to find a job implies \(m_{t,j} = h_{t,j}\). Households with \(l \leq h_{t,j}\) work and households with \(h_{t,j} \leq l \leq 1\) take leisure.
The type \( j \) family allocation problem is to maximize the utility of its member households with respect to consumption for non-working households, \( c_{t,j}^{nw} \), and consumption of working households, \( c_{t,j}^{w} \), subject to (2.18), and the given values of \( h_{t,j} \) and \( C_t \). In Lagrangian form, the problem is:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\max_{c_{t,j}^{nw}, c_{t,j}^{w}} \int_0^{h_{t,j}} \left[ \log \left( c_{t,j}^{nw} - bC_{t-1} \right) - \zeta \left( 1 + \sigma_L \right) \right] dl \\
&+ \int_{h_{t,j}}^{1} \log \left( c_{t,j}^{nw} - bC_{t-1} \right) dl + \lambda_{j,t} \left[ C_t - h_{t,j}c_{t,j}^{w} - (1 - h_{t,j}) c_{t,j}^{nw} \right].
\end{align*}
\]

Here, \( \lambda_{j,t} > 0 \) denotes the multiplier on the resource constraint. The first order conditions imply \( c_{t,j}^{nw} = c_{t,j}^{w} = C_t \). Imposing this result and evaluating the integral, we find:

\[
u (C_t - bC_{t-1}, h_{j,t}) = \log \left( C_t - bC_{t-1} \right) - \zeta h_{t,j}^{1+\sigma_L}.
\]

The problem of the family is identical to what it is in section 3.3, with the sole exception that the utility function, (3.8), is replaced by (3.21).

A type \( j \) household that draws work aversion index \( l \) is defined to be unemployed if the following two conditions are satisfied:

\[
(a) \quad l > h_{j,t}, \quad (b) \quad v_t W_{j,t} > \zeta l^{\sigma_L}.
\]

Here, \( v_t \) denotes the multiplier on the budget constraint, (3.12), in the Lagrangian representation of the family optimization problem. Expression (a) in (3.22) simply says that to be unemployed, the household must not be employed. Expression (b) in (3.22) determines whether a non-employed household is unemployed or not in the labor force. The object on the left of the inequality in (b) is the value assigned by the family to the wage, \( W_{j,t} \). The object on the right of (b) is the fixed cost of going to work for the \( l^{th} \) household. Gali (2010) suggests defining households with \( l \) satisfying (3.22) as unemployed. This approach to unemployment does not satisfy properties (i) and (iii) in the introduction. The approach does not meet the official definition of unemployment because no one is exercising effort to find a job. In addition, the existence of perfect consumption insurance implies that unemployed workers enjoy higher utility than employed workers.

We use (3.22) to define the labor force, \( l_t^* \), in the standard model. With \( l_t^* \) and aggregate employment, \( h_t \), we obtain unemployment as follows

\[
u_t = \frac{l_t^* - h_t}{l_t^*},
\]

or, after linearization about steady state:

\[
du_t = \frac{h_t}{l_t^*} \left( l_t^* - h_t \right).
\]
Here, \( h < t^* \) because of the presence of monopoly power. The object, \( \hat{h}_t \) may be obtained from (3.20) and the solution to the standard model. We now discuss the computation of the aggregate labor force, \( l^*_t \). We have

\[
l^*_t = \int_0^1 l^*_{j,t} dj,
\]

where \( l^*_{j,t} \) is the labor force associated with the \( j^{th} \) type of labor and is defined by enforcing (b) in (3.22) at equality. After linearization,

\[
\hat{l}^*_t = \int_0^1 \hat{l}^*_{j,t} dj.
\]

We compute \( \hat{l}^*_{j,t} \) by linearizing the equation that defines \( l^*_{j,t} \). After scaling that equation, we obtain

\[
\psi_{z+t} \tilde{w}_t \tilde{w}_{j,t} = c (l^*_{j,t})^{\sigma_L},
\]

where

\[
\psi_{z+t} \equiv v_t P_t z^+ \tilde{w}_t \equiv \frac{W_t}{z^+ P_t} \tilde{w}_{j,t} \equiv \frac{W_{jt}}{W_t}.
\]

Linearizing (3.23) about steady state and integrating the result over all \( j \in (0,1) \):

\[
\hat{\psi}_{z+t} + \hat{\tilde{w}}_t + \int_0^1 \hat{\tilde{w}}_{j,t} dj = \sigma_L \hat{l}^*_t.
\]

From the result in section G in the technical appendix, the integral in the above expression is zero, so that:

\[
\hat{l}^*_t = \frac{\hat{\psi}_{z+t} + \hat{\tilde{w}}_t}{\sigma_L}.
\]

4. Estimation Strategy

We estimate the parameters of the model in the previous section using the impulse response matching approach applied by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), CEE, ACEL and other papers. We apply the Bayesian version of that method proposed in CTW. To promote comparability of results across the two papers and to simplify the discussion here, we use the impulse response functions and associated probability intervals estimated using the 14 variable, 2 lag vector autoregression (VAR) estimated in CTW. Here, we consider the response of 11 variables to three shocks: the monetary policy shock, \( \varepsilon_{R,t} \) in equation (3.17), the neutral technology shock, \( \varepsilon_t \) in equation (3.2), and the investment specific shock, \( \varepsilon^*_t \) in equation (3.3). 28

\[28\] The VAR in CTW also includes data on vacancies, job findings and job separations, but these variables do not appear in the models in this paper and so we do not include their impulse responses in the analysis.
rate and the labor force which shown in Figure 4. The VAR is estimated using quarterly, seasonally adjusted data covering the period 1952Q1 to 2008Q4.

The assumptions that allow us to identify the effects of our three shocks are the ones implemented in ACEL. To identify the monetary policy shock we suppose all variables aside from the nominal rate of interest are unaffected contemporaneously by the policy shock. We make two assumptions to identify the dynamic response to the technology shocks: (i) the only shocks that affect labor productivity in the long run are the two technology shocks and (ii) the only shock that affects the price of investment relative to consumption is the innovation to the investment specific shock. All these identification assumptions are satisfied in our model. Details of our strategy for computing impulse response functions imposing the shock identification are discussed in ACEL.

Let \( \hat{\psi} \) denote the vector of impulse responses used in the analysis here. Since we consider 15 lags in the impulses, there are in principle 3 (i.e., the number of shocks) times 11 (number of variables) times 15 (number of lags) = 495 elements in \( \hat{\psi} \). However, we do not include in \( \hat{\psi} \) the 10 contemporaneous responses to the monetary policy shock that are required to be zero by our monetary policy identifying assumption. Taking the latter into account, the vector \( \hat{\psi} \) has 485 elements. To conduct a Bayesian analysis, we require a likelihood function for our ‘data’, \( \hat{\psi} \). For this, we use an approximation based on asymptotic sampling theory. In particular, when the number of observations, \( T \), is large, we have

\[
\sqrt{T} \left( \hat{\psi} - \psi (\theta_0) \right)^{\alpha} \sim N \left( 0, W(\theta_0, \zeta_0) \right). \tag{4.1}
\]

Here, \( \theta_0 \) and \( \zeta_0 \) are the parameters of the model that generated the data, evaluated at their true values. The parameter vector, \( \theta_0 \), is the set of parameters that is explicit in our model, while \( \zeta_0 \) contains the parameters of stochastic processes not included in the analysis. In (4.1), \( W(\theta_0, \zeta_0) \) is the asymptotic sampling variance of \( \hat{\psi} \), which - as indicated by the notation - is a function of all model parameters. We find it convenient to express (4.1) in the following form:

\[
\hat{\psi} \sim N (\psi (\theta_0), V (\theta_0, \zeta_0, T)), \tag{4.2}
\]

where

\[
V (\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \equiv \frac{W (\theta_0, \zeta_0)}{T}.
\]

We treat \( V (\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \) as though it were known. In practice, we work with a consistent estimator of \( V (\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \) in our analysis (for details, see CTW). That estimator is a diagonal matrix with only the variances along the diagonal. An advantage of this diagonality property is that our estimator has a simple graphical representation.

We treat the following object as the likelihood of the ‘data’, \( \hat{\psi} \), conditional on the model

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{\psi} & \sim N (\psi (\theta_0), V (\theta_0, \zeta_0, T)), \\
V (\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) & \equiv \frac{W (\theta_0, \zeta_0)}{T}.
\end{align*}
\]
parameters, \( \theta \):

\[
f \left( \hat{\psi} | \theta, V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \right) = \left( \frac{1}{2\pi} \right)^{\frac{N}{2}} |V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T)|^{-\frac{1}{2}} \times \exp \left[ -\frac{1}{2} \left( \hat{\psi} - \psi(\theta) \right)' V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T)^{-1} \left( \hat{\psi} - \psi(\theta) \right) \right]. \tag{4.3}
\]

The Bayesian posterior of \( \theta \) conditional on \( \hat{\psi} \) and \( V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \) is:

\[
f \left( \theta | \hat{\psi}, V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \right) = \frac{f \left( \hat{\psi} | \theta, V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \right) p(\theta)}{f \left( \hat{\psi} | V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \right)}, \tag{4.4}
\]

where \( p(\theta) \) denotes the priors on \( \theta \) and \( f \left( \hat{\psi} | V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \right) \) denotes the marginal density of \( \hat{\psi} \):

\[
f \left( \hat{\psi} | V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \right) = \int f \left( \hat{\psi} | \theta, V(\theta_0, \zeta_0, T) \right) p(\theta) \, d\theta.
\]

As usual, the mode of the posterior distribution of \( \theta \) can be computed by simply maximizing the value of the numerator in (4.4), since the denominator is not a function of \( \theta \). The marginal density of \( \hat{\psi} \) is required when we want an overall measure of the fit of our model and when we want to report the shape of the posterior marginal distribution of individual elements in \( \theta \). We do this using the MCMC algorithm.

5. Estimation Results for Medium-sized Model

The first section discusses model parameter values. We then show that our model of involuntary unemployment does well at accounting for the dynamics of unemployment and the labor force. Fortunately, the model is able to do this without compromising its ability to ability to account for the dynamics of standard macroeconomic variables.

5.1. Parameters

Parameters whose values are set a priori are listed in Table 1. We found that when we estimated the parameters, \( \kappa_w \) and \( \lambda_w \), the estimator drove them to their boundaries. This is why we simply set \( \lambda_w \) to a value near unity and we set \( \kappa_w = 1 \). The steady state value of inflation (a parameter in the monetary policy rule and the price and wage updating equations), the steady state government consumption to output ratio, and the growth rate of the investment-specific technology were chosen to coincide with their corresponding sample means in our data set.\(^{29}\) The growth rate of neutral technology was chosen so that, conditional on the growth rate of investment-specific technology, the steady state growth rate of

\(^{29}\text{In our model, the relative price of investment goods represents a direct observation of the technology shock for producing investment goods.}\)
output in the model coincides with the corresponding sample average in the data. We set 

\[ \xi_w = 0.75, \] 

so that the model implies wages are reoptimized once a year on average. We did not estimate this parameter because we found that it is difficult to separately identify the value of \( \xi_w \) and the curvature of family labor disutility. Finally, to ensure that we only consider parameterizations that imply an admissible probability function, \( p(e) \), we simply fix the maximal value of this probability in steady state, \( \bar{p} \), to 0.97 (see (2.14).)

The parameters for which we report priors and posteriors are listed in Table 2. We report results for two estimation exercises. In the first exercise we estimate the standard DSGE model discussed in section 3.6. In this exercise we only use the impulse responses of standard macroeconomic variables in the likelihood criterion, (4.3). In particular, we do not include the impulse responses of the unemployment rate or the labor force when we estimate the standard DSGE model. Results based on this exercise appear under the heading, ‘standard model’. In the second exercise we estimate our model with involuntary unemployment and we report those results under the heading, ‘involuntary unemployment model’.

We make several observations about the parameters listed in Table 2. First, the results in the last two columns are similar. This reflects that the two models (i) are observationally equivalent relative to the impulse responses of standard macroeconomic variables and (ii) no substantial adjustments to the parameters are required for the involuntary unemployment model to fit the unemployment and labor force data.

Second, the list of household parameters contains one endogenous parameter, the curvature of utility, \( \sigma_z \), defined in (2.39). Moreover, the list seems to be missing the structural parameters of the search technology and disutility of labor. We begin by explaining this in the context of the involuntary unemployment model. Throughout the estimation, we fix the steady state unemployment rate, \( u \), at its sample average, 0.056, and the steady state labor force participation rate, \( m \), at a value of 2/3. For given values of the four objects, \( \sigma_z, \bar{p}, u \) and \( m \), we can uniquely compute values for:

\[
F, \zeta, a, \eta. 
\]  

(5.1)

This is why \( \sigma_z \) is included in the list of estimated parameters in Table 2, while the four parameters in (5.1) are not. The parameter, \( \sigma_L \), appears in Table 2 because it is distinct from \( \sigma_z \) and separately identifiable. We apply an analogous treatment to household parameter values in the case of the standard model. In particular, throughout estimation we fix the steady state level of hours worked, \( h \), to the value implicit in the \( u \) and \( m \) used for the involuntary unemployment model. We choose the value of \( \zeta \) so that conditional on the other standard model parameter values, steady state hours worked coincides with \( h \). Since \( \sigma_z = \sigma_L \) in the standard model (see (3.21)), we only report estimation results for \( \sigma_z \) in Table 2.

\[ ^{30} \text{For details, see section E.4.2 in the technical appendix to this paper.} \]
Turning to the parameter values themselves, note first that the degree of price stickiness, $\xi_p$, is modest. The implied time between price reoptimizations is a little less than 3 quarters. The amount of information in the likelihood, (4.3), about the value of $\xi_p$ is reasonably large. The posterior standard deviation is roughly an order of magnitude smaller than the prior standard deviation and the posterior probability interval is half the length of the prior probability interval. Generally, the amount of information in the likelihood about all the parameters is large in this sense. An exception to this pattern is the coefficient on inflation in the Taylor rule, $r_x$. There appears to be relatively little information about this parameter in the likelihood. Note that $\sigma_z$ is estimated to be quite small, implying a consumption-compensated labor supply elasticity for the family of around 8. Such a high elasticity would be regarded as empirically implausible if it were interpreted as the elasticity of supply of hours by a representative agent. However, as discussed above, this is not our interpretation.

Table 3 reports steady state properties of the two models, evaluated at the posterior mean of the parameters. According to the results, the capital output ratio is a little lower than the empirical value of 12 typically reported in the real business cycle literature. The replacement ratio, $c^{sw}/c^w$, is a novel feature of our model, that does not appear in standard monetary DSGE models. The replacement ratio is estimated to be roughly 80 percent. This is a somewhat lower replacement ratio than the 90 percent number reported in the introduction. It is higher than the number reported for developed countries in OECD (2006). However, those replacement ratios pertain to income, rather than consumption.31 So, they are likely to underestimate the consumption concept relevant for us.

Not surprisingly, our model’s implications for the consumption replacement ratio is very sensitive to the habit persistence parameter, $b$. If we set the value of that parameter to zero, then our model’s steady state replacement ratio drops to 20 percent.

5.2. Impulse Response Functions of Non-labor Market Variables

Figures 1-3 display the results of the indicated macroeconomic variables to our three shocks. In each case, the solid black line is the point estimate of the dynamic response generated by our estimated VAR. The grey area is an estimate of the corresponding 95% probability interval.32 Our estimation strategy selects a model parameterization that places the model-implied impulse response functions as close as possible to the center of the grey area, while

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31 The income replacement ratio for the US is reported to be 54 percent in Table 3.2, which can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/9/36965805.pdf.
32 We compute the probability interval as follows. We simulate 2,500 sets of impulse response functions by generating an equal number of artificial data sets, each of length $T$, using the VAR estimated from the data. Here, $T$ denotes the number of observations in our actual data set. We compute the standard deviations of the artificial impulse response functions. The grey areas in Figures 1-5 are the estimated impulse response functions plus and minus 1.96 times the corresponding standard deviation.
not suffering too much of a penalty from the priors. The estimation criterion is less concerned about reproducing VAR-based impulse response functions where the grey areas are the widest.

The thick solid line and the line with solid squares in the figures display the impulse responses of the standard model and the involuntary unemployment models, respectively, at the posterior mode of the parameters. Note in Figures 1-3 that in many cases only one of these two lines is visible. Moreover, in cases where a distinction between the two lines can be discerned, they are nevertheless very close. This reflects that the two models account roughly equally well for the impulse responses to the three shocks. This is a key result. Expanding the standard model to include unemployment and the labor force does not produce a deterioration in the model’s ability to account for the estimated dynamic responses of standard macroeconomic variables to monetary policy and technology shocks.

Consider Figure 1, which displays the response of standard macroeconomic variables to a monetary policy shock. Note how the model captures the slow response of inflation. Indeed, the model even captures the ‘price puzzle’ phenomenon, according to which inflation moves in the ‘wrong’ direction initially. This apparently perverse initial response of inflation is interpreted by the model as reflecting the reduction in labor costs associated with the cut in the nominal rate of interest. It is interesting that the slow response of inflation is accounted for with a fairly modest degree of wage and price-setting frictions. The model captures the response of output and consumption to a monetary policy shock reasonably well. However, there is a substantial miss on capacity utilization. Also, the model apparently does not have the flexibility to capture the relatively sharp rise and fall in the investment response, although the model responses lie inside the grey area. The relatively large estimate of the curvature in the investment adjustment cost function, $S''$, reflects that to allow a greater response of investment to a monetary policy shock would cause the model’s prediction of investment to lie outside the grey area in the initial and later quarters. These findings for monetary policy shocks are broadly similar to those reported in CEE, ACEL and CTW.

Figure 2 displays the response of standard macroeconomic variables to a neutral technology shock. Note that the models do reasonably well at reproducing the empirically estimated responses. The dynamic response of inflation is particularly notable. The estimation results in ACEL suggest that the sharp and precisely estimated drop in inflation in response to a neutral technology shock is difficult to reproduce in a model like the standard monetary DSGE model. In describing this problem for their model, ACEL express a concern that the failure reflects a deeper problem with sticky price models. Perhaps the emphasis on price and wage setting frictions, largely motivated by the inertial response of inflation to a

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33 For a defense, based on firm-level data, of the existence of this ‘working capital’ channel of monetary policy, see Barth and Ramey (2001).
monetary shock, is shown to be misguided by the evidence that inflation responds rapidly to technology shocks.\(^{34}\) Our results suggest a far more mundane possibility. There are two differences between our model and the one in ACEL which allow it to reproduce the response of inflation to a technology shock more or less exactly without hampering its ability to account for the slow response of inflation to a monetary policy shock. First, as discussed above (see (3.4)), in our model there is no indexation of prices to lagged inflation. ACEL follows CEE in supposing that when firms cannot optimize their price, they index it fully to lagged aggregate inflation. The position of our model on price indexation is a key reason why we can account for the rapid fall in inflation after a neutral technology shock while ACEL cannot.

We suspect that our way of treating indexation is a step in the right direction from the point of view of the microeconomic data. Micro observations suggest that individual prices do not change for extended periods of time. A second distinction between our model and the one in ACEL is that we specify the neutral technology shock to be a random walk (see (3.2)), while in ACEL the growth rate of the estimated technology shock is highly autocorrelated. In ACEL, a technology shock triggers a strong wealth effect which stimulates a surge in demand that places upward pressure on marginal cost and thus inflation.\(^{35}\)

Figure 3 displays dynamic responses of macroeconomic variables to an investment-specific shock. The evidence indicates that the two models, parameterized at their posterior means, do well in accounting for these responses.

5.3. Impulse Response Functions of Unemployment and the Labor Force

Figure 4 displays the response of unemployment and the labor force to our three shocks. The key thing to note is that the model has no difficulty accounting for the pattern of responses. The probability bands are large, but the point estimates suggest that unemployment falls about 0.2 percentage points and the labor force rises a small amount after an expansionary monetary policy shock. The model roughly reproduces this pattern. In the case of each response, the model generates opposing movements in the labor force and the unemployment rate. This appears to be consistent with the evidence.

As discussed in section 3.6 above, Gali (2010) points out that the standard model has implicit in it a theory of unemployment and the labor force. Figure 5 adds the implications

\(^{34}\)The concern is reinforced by the fact that an alternative approach, one based on information imperfections and minimal price/wage setting frictions, seems like a natural one for explaining the puzzle of the slow response of inflation to monetary policy shocks and the quick response to technology shocks (see Maćkowiak and Wiederholt, 2009, Mendes, 2009, and Paciello, 2009). Dupor, Han and Tsai (2009) suggest more modest changes in the model structure to accommodate the inflation puzzle.

\(^{35}\)An additional, important, factor accounting for the damped response of inflation to a monetary policy shock (indeed, the perverse initial ‘price puzzle’ phenomenon) is the assumption that firms must borrow in advance to pay for their variable production costs. But, this model feature is present in both our model and ACEL as well as CEE.
of the standard model for these variables to the impulses displayed in Figure 4. Note that the impulses implied by the standard model are so large that they distort the scale in Figure 5. Consider, for example, the first panel of graphs in the figure, which pertain to the monetary policy shock. The standard model predicts a massive fall in the labor force after an expansionary monetary policy shock. The reason is that the rise in aggregate consumption (see Figure 1) reduces the value of work by reducing $v_t$ in (3.22). The resulting sharp drop in labor supply strongly contradicts our VAR-based evidence which suggests a small rise. Given the standard model’s prediction for the labor force, it is not surprising that the model massively over-predicts the fall in the unemployment rate after a monetary expansion.

The failure of the standard model raises a puzzle. Why does our involuntary unemployment model do so well at accounting for the unemployment rate and the labor force? The puzzle is interesting because the two models share essentially the same utility function at the level of the household. One might imagine that our model would have the same problem with wealth effects. In fact, it does not have the same problem because there is a connection in our model between the labor force and employment that does not exist in the standard model. In our model, the increased incentive to work hard that occurs in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock simultaneously encourages households to search for work more intensely, and to substitute into the labor force.

The standard model’s prediction for the response of the unemployment rate and the labor force to neutral and investment-specific technology shocks is also strongly counterfactual. The problem is always the same, and reflects the operation of wealth effects on labor supply.

The problems in Figure 5 with the standard model motivate Gali (2010), Gali, Smets and Wouters (2010) and CTW to modify the household utility function in the standard model in ways that reduce wealth effects on labor. In effect, our involuntary unemployment model represents an alternative strategy for dealing with these wealth effects. Our model has the added advantage of being consistent with all three characteristics (i)-(iii) of unemployment described in the introduction.

6. Concluding Remarks

We constructed a model in which households must make an effort to find work. Because effort is privately observed, perfect insurance against labor market outcomes is not feasible. To ensure that people have an incentive to find work, workers that find jobs must be better off than people who do not work. With additively separable utility, this translates into the proposition that employed workers have higher consumption than the non-employed. We integrate our model of unemployment into a standard monetary DSGE model and find that the model’s ability to account for standard macroeconomic variables is not diminished. At
the same time, the new model appears to account well for the dynamics of variables like unemployment and the labor force.

We leave it to future research to quantify the various ways in which the new model may contribute to policy analysis. In part, we hope that the model is useful simply because labor market data are of interest in their own right. But, we expect the model to be useful even when labor market data are not the central variables of concern. An important input into policy analysis is the estimation of ‘latent variables’ such as the output gap and the efficient, or ‘natural’, rate of interest. Other important inputs into policy analysis are forecasts of inflation and output. By allowing one to systematically integrate labor market information into the usual macroeconomic dataset, our model can be expected to provide more precise forecasts, as well as better estimates of latent variables.\(^{36}\)

Our model of unemployment has several interesting microeconomic implications that deserve closer attention. The model implies that the consumption premium of employed workers over the non-employed, \(\frac{c_T^w}{c_T^u}\), is procyclical. Although Chetty and Looney (2006) and Gruber (1997) report that there is a premium on average, we cannot infer anything about the cyclicality of the premium from the evidence they present. Studies of the cross section variance of log household consumption are a potential source of evidence on the cyclical behavior of the premium. To see this, let \(V_t\) denote the variance of log household consumption in the period \(t\) cross section in our model:\(^{37}\)

\[
V_t = (1 - h_t) h_t \left( \log \left( \frac{c_T^w}{c_T^u} \right) \right)^2.
\]

According to this expression, the model posits two countervailing forces on the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption, \(V_t\), in a recession. First, for a given distribution of the population across employed and non-employed households (i.e., holding \(h_t\) fixed), a decrease in the consumption premium leads to a decrease in consumption dispersion in a recession. Second, holding the consumption premium fixed, consumption dispersion increases as people move

\(^{36}\)For an elaboration on this point, see Basistha and Startz (2004).

\(^{37}\)Strictly speaking, this formula is correct only for the model in the second section of this paper. The relevant formula is more complicated for the model with capital because that requires a non-trivial aggregation across households that supply different types of labor services. To see how we derived the formula in the text, note that the cross sectional mean of log household consumption is:

\[
E_t = h_t \log (c_t^w) + (1 - h_t) \log (c_t^u),
\]

so that

\[
V_t = h_t (\log c_t^w - E_t)^2 + (1 - h_t) (\log c_t^u - E_t)^2
\]

\[= h_t (1 - h_t) (\log c_t^w - \log c_T^u)^2.
\]
from employment to non-employment with the fall in $h_t$. These observations suggest that (i) if $V_t$ is observed to drop in recessions, this is evidence in favor of the model’s prediction that the consumption premium is procyclical and (ii) if $V_t$ is observed to stay constant or rise in recessions then we cannot conclude anything about the cyclicality of the consumption premium. Evidence in Heathcote, Perri and Violante (2010) suggests that the US was in case (i) in three of the previous five recessions. In particular, they show that the dispersion in log household non-durable consumption decreased in the 1980, 2001 and 2007 recessions. We conclude tentatively that the observed cross sectional dispersion of consumption across households lends support to our model’s implication that the consumption premium is procyclical.

Another interesting implication of the model is its prediction that high unemployment in recessions reflects the procyclicality of effort in job search. There is some evidence that supports this implication of the model. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009) constructs a measure of the number of ‘discouraged workers’. These are people who are available to work and have looked for work in the past 12 months, but are not currently looking because they believe no jobs are available. This statistic has only been gathered since 1994, and so it covers just two recessions. However, in both the recessions for which we have data, the number of discouraged workers increased substantially. For example, the number of discouraged workers jumped 70 percent from 2008Q1 to 2009Q1. In fact, the number of discouraged workers is only a tiny fraction of the labor force. However, to the extent that the sentiments of discouraged workers are shared by workers more generally, a jump in the number of discouraged workers could be a signal of a general decline in job search intensity in recessions. But, this is an issue that demands a more careful investigation.

---

38 This statement assumes that the empirically relevant case, $h_t > 1/2$.
39 Of course, we cannot rule out that the drop in $V_t$ in recessions has nothing to do with the mechanism in our model but rather reflects some other source of heterogeneity in the data.
40 A similar observation was made about the 2007 recession in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009).
References


Table 1: Non-Estimated Parameters in Medium-sized Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Capital share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>Discount factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>1.0083</td>
<td>Gross inflation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta_y$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Government consumption to GDP ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa_w$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wage indexation to $\pi_{t-1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda_w$</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>Wage markup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\xi_w$</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Wage stickiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi$</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>Max, $p(e)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_n$</td>
<td>1.0041</td>
<td>Gross neutral tech. growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_\varphi$</td>
<td>1.0018</td>
<td>Gross invest. tech. growth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Medium-sized Model Steady State at Posterior Mean for Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Standard Model</th>
<th>Involuntary Unemp. Model</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$p_k k/y$</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>Capital to GDP ratio (quarterly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c/y$</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>Consumption to GDP ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i/y$</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Investment to GDP ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H = h$</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>Steady state labor input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e^{cw}/e^w$</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>Replacement ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R$</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>1.014</td>
<td>Gross nom. int. rate (quarterly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^{real}$</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>1.006</td>
<td>Gross real int. rate (quarterly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r^k$</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>Capital rental rate (quarterly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u$</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>Labor force (involuntary unemployment model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l^*$</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Labor force (standard model)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varsigma$</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>Slope, labor disutility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Intercept, labor disutility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>Slope, $p(e)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>Intercept, $p(e)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parameter</td>
<td>Prior</td>
<td>Posterior&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Standard Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>Mean, Std.Dev. [5% and 95%]</td>
<td>Mean, Std.Dev. [5% and 95%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Price setting parameters</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Stickiness</td>
<td>( \zeta_p )</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.50, 0.15 [0.23, 0.72]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Markup</td>
<td>( \lambda_f )</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>1.20, 0.15 [1.04, 1.50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monetary authority parameters</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Rule: Int. Smoothing</td>
<td>( \rho_R )</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.80, 0.10 [0.47, 0.95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Rule: Inflation Coef.</td>
<td>( r_{\pi} )</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>1.60, 0.15 [1.38, 1.87]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taylor Rule: GDP Coef.</td>
<td>( r_{\theta} )</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>0.20, 0.10 [0.07, 0.39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household parameters</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Habit</td>
<td>( b )</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>0.75, 0.15 [0.47, 0.95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power, labor disutility&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( \sigma_L )</td>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>10.0, 5.77 [1.00, 19.0]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inverse labor supply elast.&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>( \sigma_z )</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>0.30, 0.20 [0.06, 0.69]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Adj. Costs Curv.</td>
<td>( \sigma_a )</td>
<td>Gamma</td>
<td>1.00, 0.75 [0.15, 2.46]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shocks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocorr. Invest. Tech.</td>
<td>( \rho_{\psi} )</td>
<td>Uniform</td>
<td>0.50, 0.29 [0.05, 0.95]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std.Dev. Neutral Tech. Shock</td>
<td>( \sigma_n )</td>
<td>Inv. Gamma</td>
<td>0.20, 0.10 [0.10, 0.37]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std.Dev. Invest. Tech. Shock</td>
<td>( \sigma_{\psi} )</td>
<td>Inv. Gamma</td>
<td>0.20, 0.10 [0.10, 0.37]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std.Dev. Monetary Shock</td>
<td>( \sigma_R )</td>
<td>Inv. Gamma</td>
<td>0.40, 0.20 [0.21, 0.74]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Based on standard random walk metropolis algorithm. 150 000 draws, 30 000 for burn-in, acceptance rate 26%.

<sup>b</sup> In the case of the baseline model, \( \sigma_z \) and \( \sigma_L \) coincide. In the case of the involuntary unemployment model these two parameters are different.
Figure 1: Dynamic Responses of Non–Labor Market Variables to a Monetary Policy Shock

- Real GDP
- Inflation (GDP deflator)
- Federal Funds Rate
- Real Consumption
- Real Investment
- Capacity Utilization
- Rel. Price of Investment
- Hours Worked Per Capita
- Real Wage

Legend:
- VAR 95%
- VAR Mean
- Standard Model
- Involuntary Unemployment Model
Figure 2: Dynamic Responses of Non–Labor Market Variables to a Neutral Technology Shock

- Real GDP
- Inflation (GDP deflator)
- Federal Funds Rate
- Real Consumption
- Real Investment
- Capacity Utilization
- Rel. Price of Investment
- Hours Worked Per Capita
- Real Wage

Key:
- VAR 95%
- VAR Mean
- Standard Model
- Involuntary Unemployment Model
Figure 3: Dynamic Responses of Non-Labor Market Variables to an Investment Specific Technology Shock

- **Real GDP**
- **Inflation (GDP deflator)**
- **Federal Funds Rate**
- **Real Consumption**
- **Real Investment**
- **Capacity Utilization**
- **Rel. Price of Investment**
- **Hours Worked Per Capita**
- **Real Wage**

Legend:
- **VAR 95%**
- **VAR Mean**
- **Standard Model**
- **Involuntary Unemployment Model**
Figure 4: Dynamic Responses of Labor Market Variables to Three Shocks
Figure 5: Dynamic Responses of Labor Market Variables to Three Shocks

Unemployment Rate

Monetary Shock

Labor Force

VAR 95%

VAR Mean

Standard Model

Involuntary Unemployment Model

Unemployment Rate

Neutral Tech. Shock

Invest. Tech. Shock

Labor Force

Labor Force

VAR 95%

VAR Mean

Standard Model

Involuntary Unemployment Model